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Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance  
 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION AND TAX 
COMPLIANCE: A TRANSACTIONAL COST PERSPECTIVE 
Wei Cui* 
(Forthcoming in the University of Toronto Law Journal) 
 A common phenomenon in tax administration in developing 
countries is that tax is collected not according to the rules of law but 
according to informal agreements between taxpayers and tax 
collectors. This article offers a novel explanation of this phenomenon 
in the Chinese context in terms of administrative decentralization. 
Administrative decentralization is defined as the concentration of 
government functions at the lowest ranks of a geographically-
dispersed bureaucracy. Decentralization increases communication 
costs associated with the implementation of law, and changes the 
structure of taxpayers’ costs in obtaining knowledge about the law. 
As a result, a “semi-compliant” type of behavior, involving many 
taxpayers who would have been compliant under a rule-based 
system, emerges where tax is remitted and collected despite both 
sides being under-informed about the law. The article argues that 
this dynamic has frustrated tax administration reform in China and, 
interestingly, explains the underdevelopment of the tax legal 
profession and of tax litigation.   Keywords: Decentralization, informal tax collection, rule of law, tax administration in developing countries, tax compliance
*  Associate Professor, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law. 
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Email: cui@law.ubc.ca. I am grateful to 
David Schizer, Bill Simon, Chenyan Lü, two anonymous referees, and audiences at 
Cornell Law School, the UBC Law Faculty Colloquium, and Northwestern Law 
School for discussions of and comments on the paper. All remaining errors are my 
own. 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A central and persistent theme in economic scholarship on the 
role of taxation in economic development is that the capacity of tax 
administrations crucially determines the range of tax policy 
instruments available in developing countries.1 For example, in a 
recent series of papers and a book,2 Roger Gordon and others 
hypothesize that the state of development of the financial sector 
imposes important constraints on tax administration. How valuable 
the services are that the financial institutions of a country can 
provide to businesses—which is a matter essentially exogenous to 
the design of the country’s tax system—determines whether 
businesses will choose to use financial intermediation. When 
financial sectors are less developed, fewer businesses use financial 
services. But if tax collectors cannot rely on the paper trails 
generated by businesses’ financial records to audit taxable activities 
of most taxpayers, they would have to focus on taxing capital-
intensive sectors that either unavoidably use financial services, or in 
any case operate in such ways that are easy for tax agencies to 
monitor. This, according to these authors, explains the paradoxical 
fact that many capital-starved developing countries nonetheless tax 
capital intensively.  
Nonetheless, many economists admit that tax administration 
remains largely a black box for those who study tax policy and 
development. A leading expert in the field recently described tax 
administration as the “dull but critical job of moving beyond the 
moment of innovation to the hard work of implementation,”3 
lamenting that even policy instruments such as the value added tax 
(VAT), which is supposed to be relatively easy to administer 
(compared to, say, the personal income tax), can under-perform 
1 See, e.g. Richard Bird, “Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform” (2004) 
Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin” 10(3), 134-50 and the extensive literature cited therein. 
2 Roger Gordon and Wei Li, “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many 
Puzzles and a Possible Explanation” (2009) Journal of Public Economics 93(7-8),  
855-866; Gordon and Li, “Puzzling Tax Structures in Developing Countries: A 
Comparison of Two Alternative Explanations” (2007) Fiscal Policy And 
Management In East Asia, NBER-EASE, vol. 16,  9-35; Roger Gordon, ed, 
Taxation In Developing Countries: Six Case Studies And Policy Implications (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2010)(hereinafter “Six Case Studies”) 
3 Michael Keen, “Taxation and Development – Again” (2012) IMF Working 
Papers 12/220, International Monetary Fund, p 14.  
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because of limited administrative capacity.4 Another recent survey 
depicts the main challenges facing tax administration in developing 
countries as arising from the following factors: (i) the size of the 
agricultural and informal sectors; (ii) the (limited) use of financial 
services; (iii) the difficulty of restructuring government organization 
to suit the need of modern tax administration; (iv) the shortage of 
skilled human capital; and (v) the lack of political will to implement 
obvious improvement strategies.5 It can be observed that, of these 
five listed factors, most (i.e. (i), (ii), (iv), and (v)) are largely 
exogenous to the design of tax administration,6 while others ((iii) and 
possibly (v)) may tell us no more than that some developing 
countries failed to adopt the prescriptions of international 
organizations. Efforts to theorize about the organization of tax 
administration itself are relatively scant. Perhaps as a result, the 
recommendations for tax administration reform in developing 
countries that have been put forward by international organizations 
such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) tend 
to be remarkably vague. For example, adopting the VAT was hoped 
to “catalyze” administrative reform.7 Other casual proposals, such as 
imposing greater judicial oversight,8 may be no more than stabs in 
4  Id. See also James Alm and Denvil Duncan, Estimating Tax Agency 
Efficiency (paper presented at the Columbia Law School Tax Policy Colloquium, 
November 7, 2013) (“there has been little systematic analysis of [the tax] 
administrative dimension, at least by economists”).   
5  Richard M. Bird and Eric M. Zolt, “Technology and Taxation in 
Developing Countries: From Hand to Mouse” (2008) National Tax Journal, 
LXI(4), 791-821. See also Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, “Why Do 
Developing Countries Tax So Little?” (2014) Journal of Economic Perspectives 
28(4), 99–120 (discussing the consequence of informal economies and the need for 
“political will” in tax policy). 
6 Some of the literature on tax and development, especially those generated 
under projects sponsored by international organizations, go into much prescriptive 
detail about human resource management. See, e.g. Richard Bird and Milka 
Casanegra De Jantscher, ed, Improving Tax Administration in Developing 
Countries (Washington DC: IMF, 1992). It is not surprising that some scholars 
find such studies “dull” (whether or not “critical”).  
7  IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, Revenue Mobilization in Developing 
Countries March 8, 2011 (hereinafter “IMF 2011 Report”) p 10. This recent report 
repeatedly mentions administrative reform but does not offer (or cite) any specific 
analysis or recommendation.  
8 See, e.g. IMF 2011 Report, p 9; Gordon, Introduction to Six Case Studies, 
supra note 2, p 7.  
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the dark.9    
Indeed, a common response by economists to this lack of 
understanding is to take administrative weaknesses in developing 
countries as a given, and then to rely on the conceptual tools that 
public finance economists are familiar with—varying tax bases and 
tax rates, identifying substitute or complementary goods, measuring 
elasticities, and so on—to recommend policies that may significantly 
deviate from policies normally considered for developed countries. 
For example, if the informal sector undermines VAT implementation, 
one might switch back to tariffs and excise taxes.10 The implicit idea 
is to find ways of raising revenue despite administrative weaknesses 
that plague developing countries, and to return to the improvement of 
administration only when these countries are further along the 
development path. 
In this article, I attempt to motivate a different research strategy, 
by showing how one may be able to unpack the black box of tax 
administration in developing countries through law and economics 
analysis. In particular, I consider a problematic approach to tax 
collection, under which revenue is raised not according to the rules 
of law but according to informal agreements between the taxpayer 
and the tax collector. Such practice, which one might call “non-rule-
based” tax collection, has wide manifestations in many countries 
(both currently and in the past), and is almost uniformly disparaged 
by tax policymakers and administrators in developed countries.11 
Whether such disparagement is justified is a complex question,12 but 
9 As Part IV.B infra argues, administrative configurations can easily preclude 
the possibility of judicial oversight, even when judicial institutions are otherwise 
readily available. 
10 See Joseph Stiglitz, “Development-Oriented Tax Policy”, Chapter 2 in Six 
Case Studies, supra note 2. For a critical response to such a proposal, see Michael 
Keen, “VAT, Tariffs, and Withholding: Border Taxes and Informality in 
Developing Countries” (2008) Journal of Public Economics 92(10-11), 1892-1906. 
11 See the Introduction to Six Case Studies 2010 (at 7): “How to improve tax 
administration is a difficult problem, and one the present volume only touches on. 
One approach mentioned is to improve the incentives faced by tax officials, so that 
their objectives will be to enforce the law rather than simply to collect revenue”.  
12 See further discussion in Part V infra. The main argument against such 
practice is that it is inconsistent with and undermines self-assessment, and 
precludes implementing modern tax policy in the way that the rule of law allows. 
The practice may also generate corruption, but that problem is regarded here as 
second-order, whereas the much more serious problem is that it perpetuates 
inefficient taxes and renders the implementation of more efficient modern tax 
policy instruments infeasible. 
 
Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance Wei Cui  
 Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance 5 
my purpose is not to evaluate the practice but to explore some of its 
causes. I show that this administrative practice can persist even in a 
very active economy with a limited informal sector, where revenue is 
being successfully raised, and where tax collectors are well-educated 
and well-compensated. Moreover, the practice has persisted despite 
apparent evidence that the government views it as problematic and 
has mobilized political resources to reform it. In the particular 
context examined, therefore, this form of tax collection is not 
explained by the factors that are normally identified as standing in 
the way of improving tax administration.  
The particular context in which this article examines the 
phenomenon of non-rule-based tax collection is contemporary China. 
I argue that in China, a crucial explanation of the phenomenon is a 
high degree of administrative decentralization. Moreover, the path of 
causation from decentralization to a specific mode of tax collection 
runs through behaviors that are of intrinsic importance to legal 
systems. Decentralized tax administration fundamentally increases 
the costs of communicating the content of law, and alters the 
transactions costs for taxpayers to interact with officials in such a 
way that a large body of taxpayers may be engaged in a form of 
“semi-compliant” behavior—heeding the preferences of local tax 
administrators, but in collective ignorance of the law.13 While the 
non-rule-based tax collection that results may have both advantages 
and disadvantages, my aim is to identify a cause of this practice in 
China in a fundamental institutional arrangement that is not normally 
thought to affect tax administration.  
The causal connection between non-rule-based tax collection 
and decentralization argued for in this article is interesting for a 
number of reasons. First, because administrative decentralization has 
been the preferred mode of Chinese bureaucratic organization across 
regulatory areas, and has specific roots in Chinese history, it may be 
viewed as an externally given constraint on the design of tax 
administration.14 Its mechanisms also require investigation at the 
institutional level.15 Therefore, it is a type of “independent variable” 
13  As discussed in Parts III.A, IV.A and V, infra, decentralization also 
prevents the adoption of some crucial administration techniques that are used in 
developed countries.  
14 See Part VI infra. 
15  Because tax administration in developing countries has been so 
impenetrable, commentators on the subject have not been unwilling to tell 
anecdotes of random mishaps to illustrate causes of failure of tax administration. 
See, e.g. Bird and Zolt, supra note 5, footnotes 12 (clerical staff in Indian tax 
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that social scientists would not want to miss. Second, at the same 
time, making tax administration less decentralized is also clearly 
conceivable, if the government is able to reflect on decentralization’s 
relative costs and benefits and to mobilize reform. Decentralization is 
thus a kind of determinant of administrative practice that is more 
amenable to change than those (such as the informal economy and 
the state of development of the financial sector) that scholars of tax 
and development have traditionally alluded to. Third, although there 
is evidence that China is an international outlier in terms of its degree 
of administrative decentralization,16 the way decentralization leads to 
non-rule-based tax collection sheds light on the dimensions of this 
latter practice more generally. For example, I argue that such practice 
should be distinguished from presumptive taxation, and that it could 
create significant social costs even without generating a high level of 
corruption.17  I also argue that the prevalence of such practice is 
likely to result in low demand for tax professional services and low 
levels of tax litigation—which are themselves important phenomena 
of tax systems that have received little theoretical explanation.   
The arguments of this article are also relevant to two areas of 
legal scholarship other than tax and development. One is the 
extensive literature on law and development. Social scientists have 
long posited that legal institutions are important for economic 
development.18 But how, and how much, legal institutions matter 
have been subject to much debate in recent research. Recent 
theoretical work, for example, has highlighted many weaknesses in 
the original claims, made by founders of the law and economics 
movement like Ronald Coase and Harold Demsetz, about the 
agencies punching holes for name tags in diskettes that contained important 
taxpayer information) and 15 (employee unplugged and disabled tax agency IT 
system when trying to make tea).   
16 See discussion in Part II.B infra. This article thus does not aim to establish 
an explanation of non-rule-based tax collection that has universal application.  
17  See text accompanying note 113 infra. As argued there, presumptive 
taxation is a way of applying rules on the basis of limited information, whereas 
non-rule-based tax collection is a matter of failing to apply rules even when 
information would have been available to tax administrators.  
18 See, e.g. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, 
and Robert Vishny, “Law and Finance” (1998) Journal of Political Economy 
106:6, 1113-55; Robert Cooter and Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Solomon's Knot: How 
Law Can End The Poverty of Nations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2013); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, “Institutions as 
the Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth,” in Philippe Aghion and Stephen 
Durlauf, ed, Handbook Of Economic Growth (North Holland, 2005). 
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functions of property and contract regimes.19 Consistently with such 
theoretical critique, political economy research has found mixed 
empirical evidence for the significance of property and contract 
enforcement regimes for development.20 Some political economists 
have thus explicitly proposed that legal institutions are of secondary 
importance to economic development.21 This debate, however, has 
largely neglected the administrative state in developing countries. As 
in developed countries, developing country governments need to rely 
on the rule of law to collect modern taxes, pursue environmental and 
other regulations, and implement a wide variety of social policies. 
Much of the importance of the rule of law in the 21st century is tied 
to the regulatory state,22 and the failure of rule of law within the 
spheres of routine government activities can seriously deter or distort 
economic development. Yet this has been little examined in law and 
development scholarship, which has equated legal mechanisms and 
institutions narrowly with the protection of property, contract, and 
minority shareholder rights and with judicial independence. This 
article, in examining determinants of the capacity of the government 
in a developing country to transmit legal information and secure 
compliance, begins to fill that gap. 
19 See, e.g. David de Meza, “Coase Theorem”, in Peter Newman, ed. The 
New Palgrave Dictionary Of Economics and the Law, 1:270–282 (1998) (the 
delineation of property rights does not always increase economic inefficiency), 
Steven Shavell, Foundations Of Economic Analysis Of Law (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2004) (tax and regulatory regimes are often superior to 
legal systems that only assign and protect property rights); Lisa Bernstein, “Opting 
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry” (1992) Journal of Legal Studies 21:115–157 (informal practices are often 
adequate substitutes for formal legal institutions in securing contract performance). 
20 See, e.g. Timothy Besley, “Investment Incentives and Property Rights, 
Peter Newman, ed. The New Palgrave Dictionary Of Economics and the Law, 
2:359–365 (1998)(surveying mixed evidence for the significance of property right 
regimes for economic development); Xiaozu Wang, Lixin Xu and Tian Zhu, 
“Foreign Direct Investment under Weak Rule of Law: Theory and Evidence from 
China” (2012) Economics of Transition 20 (3), 401–424 (finding that variations in 
contract protection had no effect on volume of FDI across Chinese cities). 
21  See, e.g. Chenggang Xu, “The Fundamental Institutions of China’s 
Reforms and Development” (2011) Journal of Economic Literature 49:4, 1076–
1151; Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, “Regional Decentralization 
and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style” (2005) Journal of Public 
Economics, 89, 1719-1742.  
22  Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the 
Madisonian Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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Another research area to which this article contributes is the 
study of the Chinese legal system. There has been much controversy 
regarding how much progress China has made towards the rule of 
law,23 though foreign scholars tend to be uniform in blaming China’s 
authoritarian government for failures to meet rule of law norms. 
However, detailed examinations of the rule of law in China have 
generally focused narrowly on judicial institutions, despite the facts 
that China’s civil law judiciary resembles other government 
bureaucracies in many ways,24 and that the lack of political 
independence of the judiciary is by no means unique to China.25 The 
arguments in this article show that conditions for the rule of law may 
often be violated in China well before disputes arise and reach courts, 
such that the presence or absence of an independent judiciary may be 
of secondary significance for important regulatory areas.26 
Moreover, excessive administrative decentralization may have held 
back the rule of law in ways that are contrary to the preference of 
China’s authoritarian government itself.27 Insofar as the phenomena 
studied in this article have relevance beyond tax administration,28 it 
would seem that moral or ideological critiques of the lack of judicial 
independence in China, while correct in their own terms, reflect an 
under-appreciation of the fundamental importance of the rule of law 
for modern societies. 
The article proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates that, despite 
successful revenue mobilization in the last two decades, Chinese tax 
policymakers face many of the same challenges confronting their 
counterparts in other developing countries, and that serious 
constraints on further tax reform arise from problems in tax 
administration. Moreover, these problems have persisted despite 
eagerness on the part of the Chinese government to tackle them. Nor 
23  See, generally, Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China: 
Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011). 
24 Donald Clarke, “Empirical Research in Chinese Law”, in Erik Jensen & 
Thomas Heller, ed,  Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the 
Rule of Law (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003) 164-192. 
25 For a careful empirical analysis of the similar lack of independence of the 
Japanese judiciary, see J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring 
Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan (Chicago, IL: 
Chicago University Press, 2003)  
26 See Part IV.B infra.  
27 See notes 56, 62-66, infra, and accompanying text. 
28 This is quite likely, given the general feature of excessive administrative 
decentralization in China discussed in Part VI infra. 
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are these problems easily attributable to features of the economic 
environment. Part II then explains, both qualitatively and using 
original quantitative data, how a fundamental facet of Chinese 
bureaucratic organization, administrative decentralization, has 
shaped tax administration: Chinese tax administration is concentrated 
in tax bureaus and “outposts” situated at county and lower 
administrative levels, and some core organizational features of such 
government units are determined by such decentralization. Part III, 
the core of this article, analyzes conceptually the impact of 
decentralization on transactional costs in the implementation of law. 
It defines the concepts of the communication and advisory costs of 
implementing law, and offers a theoretical analysis of how, by 
changing these costs, decentralization results in non-rule-based 
collection practices and a form of semi-compliant behavior.  
Part IV then offers indirect evidence of the theory in Part III, by 
arguing that decentralization, and the non-rule-based collection 
practices it creates, also explain the under-development of the tax 
profession and the under-use of judicial monitoring in China. Part V 
considers certain alternative explanations, characterizations, and 
evaluations of non-rule-based collection practices. Part VI briefly 
examines the institutional and historical reasons why Chinese tax 
administration is so decentralized. A brief Conclusion follows. 
 
I. 
TAX ADMINISTRATION AS A BOTTLENECK ON TAX REFORM: THE 
CHINESE CASE 
 
A recent OECD report on tax policy and reform in China states 
that “China’s tax regime has raised an increasing amount of tax 
revenues in relation to GDP over the past 20 years to…support 
development while at the same time maintaining sound public 
finances.”29 This positive assessment is based on such facts as that, 
in each year after 1997, growth in tax revenue in China has outpaced 
even its recording-setting GDP growth—very often by a wide 
margin.30 In one sense, therefore, the tax system in contemporary 
China seems to have already dealt with the grave challenge believed 
29 Bert Brys, et al, Tax Policy and Tax Reform in the People's Republic of 
China, OECD Taxation Working Papers No. 18 (September 2013), available at 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/tax-policy-and-tax-reform-in-the-people-s-
republic-of-china_5k40l4dlmnzw-en. 
30 Id, at 7 (Figure 2). 
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to confront many developing countries, which is to mobilize 
sufficient revenue to fund basic public expenditures.31  
Nonetheless, as the OECD report goes on to discuss—and as 
other recent studies of contemporary Chinese public finance have 
also concluded32—the Chinese tax system has much more in 
common with other large developing or transitional economies than 
with a typical OECD country.  This can be seen first through the 
mixture of taxes. The Chinese corporate income tax raises more than 
three times the revenue that is yielded by the personal income tax.33 
This is a pattern widely observed in developing countries and stands 
in sharp contrast to the pattern in developed countries.34 Indirect 
taxes—the value added tax (VAT), sales taxes, and various excises—
in turn represent a far greater share of total revenue than all taxes on 
income, which is again a distinguishing feature of the tax structures 
in developing countries in comparison with developed countries.35 
When compared to the OECD countries, the percentages to overall 
revenue of social security contributions and property taxes are also 
low in China,36 as is the overall ratio of tax revenue to GDP.37  It is 
not clear, therefore, that China’s success at revenue mobilization can 
be attributed to the adoption of any distinctive tax policy relative to 
other developing countries. Moreover, revenue collection falls well 
short of meeting the expenditure goals that the government has set 
for itself.38  
Beyond the tax mix, the Chinese tax system also has much in 
common with developing countries in terms of tax administration. 
31 Clemens Fuest and George R. Zodrow, e.d. Critical Issues in Taxation and 
Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 3. 
32 See, e.g. the essays collected in Jiwei Lou and Shuilin Wang, ed, Public 
Finance in China (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2008).  
33 See Brys, et al, supra note 30, Section 1.3  
34 See Vito Tanzi and Howell Zee, “Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: 
Developing Countries” (2000)  National Tax Journal, 53 (2), 299-328, at 307. The 
pattern also implies a much higher level of capital taxation than is regarded as 
optimal under conventional economic theory. Id, at 305. 
35  Richard Bird, “Tax Challenges facing Developing Countries: A 
Perspective from Outside the Policy Arena” (2011) Background paper prepared for 
the UK Department for International Development (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393991), at 17. This typically implies more regressive 
tax structures than observed in developed countries. 
36 For low use of property taxation in developing countries, see Tanzi and 
Zee, supra note 35, at 300.  
37 Athar Hussain and Nicholas Stern, “Public Finances, the Role of the State, 
and Economic Transformation, 1978–2020,” in Lou and Wang, supra note 33. 
38 Id. 
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This in a way is predictable, if theorists of tax and development are 
generally right that tax administrative capacity is the most important 
determinant of tax structure in developing countries.39 While it is not 
the intention of this article to provide a detailed description or 
evaluation of Chinese tax administrative practices, a few examples 
will be offered below to illustrate the point. Before going into the 
examples, however, it is worth noting that when features of tax 
policy design are determined by tax administrative capacity, 
important implications follow for evaluating the economic efficiency 
of these features. Generally, taxes that are inefficient and 
distortionary in one set of circumstances (e.g. an economic 
environment characterized by perfectly competitive markets and no 
externalities) may be efficient and optimal in another (e.g. an 
environment characterized by imperfect competition, externalities, 
and/or pre-existing distortions induced by tax and other regulatory 
policies).40 Therefore it may not be possible, in the abstract, to say 
whether a tax mix (such as the one described of China above) is 
socially optimal or not. However, where tax policy options are 
limited by administrative constraints and where policies adopted 
mainly respond to such limitations, then it is less likely that a policy 
that looks sub-optimal is in fact optimal (i.e. as a matter of the 
second best, given other pre-existing distortions).41 Accordingly, the 
discussion below emphasizes how methods of Chinese tax 
administration have shaped the substance of Chinese tax law. 
A first example is the administration of China’s VAT, the largest 
source of revenue for the government.42 VAT administration is 
handled by a large and well-resourced bureaucracy, the State Tax 
Bureau (or STB) system.43 There is, however, very little VAT audit 
capacity. Instead, VAT collection relies almost entirely on a unique 
“golden tax project” (GTP), where sales and purchases are monitored 
39 See literature cited in notes 1-2 supra. 
40 Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second 
Best” (1956) The Review of Economic Studies 24(1), 11-32. 
41 See Part V infra for further discussion. 
42 For an overview of the substantive rules of the Chinese VAT, see Wei Cui 
and Alan Wu, “China”, Chapter 6 in T. Ecker, M. Lang and I. Lejeune (Eds.), The 
Future of Indirect Taxation: Recent Trends in VAT and GST Systems around the 
World (Kluwer, 2011), pp 159-89. For a discussion of the most important 
departures of the Chinese VAT from international VAT norms, see Alan Schenk, 
Victor Thuronyi, and Wei Cui, Value Added Tax: A Comparative Perspective, 2d 
ed (Cambridge University Press, 2015) Chapter 14. 
43 See note 61 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the STB 
system. 
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and verified by tax agencies using an extensive system of encryption 
devices, specially printed invoices, and computerized cross-
checking.44 As “high-tech” as this may sound, in reality the GTP’s 
main function is to prevent criminal tax fraud (i.e. deductions and 
VAT refunds claimed when no purchases have been made), 
something that most other countries prevent by carrying out VAT 
audits.45 Whether or not the GTP is successful in stopping criminal 
VAT fraud in China is controversial.46 What is not controversial is 
that the GTP imposes heavy compliance burdens on all taxpayers, 
including generally compliant ones, through requirements to record 
and report sales and purchases that meet the government’s 
technological specifications.47 It has been noted that the GTP goes 
against the general conception of the VAT as based on self-
assessment.48 At the same time, the GTP is for most intent and 
purposes the only way in which tax agencies monitor VAT 
compliance.49 Because of the limits of tax administrators’ audit 
capacity, Chinese VAT rules are rife with restrictive conditions that 
seriously impede businesses’ capacity to claim VAT credits for 
purchases made.50 This is so much the case that taxpayers, tax 
professionals, and even tax policymakers and academics in China 
44  See Jane Winn and Angela Zhang, “China’s Golden Tax Project: A 
Technological Strategy for Reducing VAT Fraud” (2013) 4 Peking University 
Journal of Legal Studies 1; Schenk et al, supra note 43, Chapter 14, Section V.  
45  Graham Harrison and Russell Krelove, “VAT Refunds: A Review of 
Country Experience” (2005) International Monetary Fund Working Paper 
WP/05/218; Liam Ebrill, et al, The Modern VAT (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2001), 
Chapter 14. 
46 Signs that it is not include (i) an extensive and harsh legal regime dealing 
with the “sham issuances” of VAT invoices, which cannot be controlled by the 
GTP, (ii) continued government reports of a high level of criminal activity, despite 
the fact that features of the Chinese VAT regime (such as unavailability of VAT 
refunds for domestic supplies) already limit the payoff for such activity. See 
Schenk et al, supra note 43, Chapter 14, Section VI. 
47 See EY, A Look inside China’s VAT System: Understanding How the 
Regime Works to Effectively Manage VAT Risks and Opportunities (March 
2013), available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/China_VAT_system_en/$FILE/Chin
a_VAT_system_en.pdf (highlighting the burdens and risks created by the Golden 
Tax Project).   
48 See Ebrill, et al, supra note 46, Chapter 13.  
49 A term widely used by Chinese tax agencies to characterize their own 
strategy of administration captures this fact concisely: “Using invoices to control 
tax compliance” (yipiao kongshui). 
50 See Schenk et al, supra note 43, Chapter 14, Sections VI.A, VI.C, and 
VII.B. 
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widely believe that the burden of the VAT is borne by businesses, 
and not by final consumers,51 which is extraordinary given the 
typical international understanding of the VAT as a tax on final 
consumption. Much of this understanding, and the rules and practices 
that sustain it, can be traced to China’s approach to VAT 
administration. 
A second example is offered by the administration of the 
business tax (BT), a cascading tax that substitutes for the VAT in the 
service sector and in dealing with real property transactions. The 
Chinese BT is also collected with virtually no audit nor self-
assessment. Most of the time, the only way in which that the 
government verifies that a transaction has occurred (for both the 
vendor and the customer) is that a special form of invoice is issued. 
No tax returns or accounting book entries are used. Quite often, BT 
invoices are obtained by enterprises from tax agencies—and the tax 
amount paid when such invoices are obtained—on the basis of 
estimated sales revenue, which can deviate significantly from actual 
revenue.52 Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, two thirds of the 
nation’s BT revenue is collected from financial services, real estate, 
and construction, sectors that are generally capital-intensive and easy 
to monitor by tax collectors. The effective tax rate on other services 
(especially consumer services) is likely quite low. This had made it 
politically and administratively difficult to integrate the VAT and the 
BT, even though the differential tax treatment of goods and services 
increasingly generate distortions.53  
Third, personal income tax revenue is collected largely through 
withholding, whereas the annual return-filing and self-declaration 
requirements imposed on high-income taxpayers since 2007 still 
generate no additional revenue. As a result, many tax policy 
options—such as deductions or credits for dependents, deductions 
for investment losses, etc.—are simply precluded by administrative 
limitations, whether or not they are desirable from a policy 
51 For a discussion of the prevalent belief in China that the VAT is a tax on 
businesses and not on final consumption, see Wei Cui, “China’s Business-Tax-to-
VAT Reform: an Interim Assessment” (2014) British Tax Review  2014(5), 617-
641.   
52 This has fueled a large black market in which tax invoices are traded. See 
David Barboza, “Coin of Realm in China Graft: Phony Receipts”, New York 
Times, August 3, 2013.  
53  See Cui, supra note 51. In comparison to the VAT, the BT imposes 
relatively low compliance costs. This aggravates the gap in treatment between 
supplies subject to the VAT and those subject to the BT.  
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perspective. The tax on business income earned by sole proprietors, 
the only source of tax on personal income that is not collected 
through withholding, is collected either through presumptive taxation 
methods or through flawed auditing that relies almost exclusively on 
invoices.54  
These patterns that one observes in the administration of some of 
China’s largest taxes are, not surprisingly, also found in collection 
practices for the smaller taxes as well. Indeed, it is possible to make 
a generalization across tax types: Chinese tax administration at the 
moment generally relies very little on taxpayer self-assessments or 
on audits.55 This implies that in routine tax compliance, taxpayers 
generally transmit relatively little information about their business 
activities that should determine their tax liabilities, and tax collectors 
also generally do little to enhance such information through 
investigations. Even when revenue is coming in for the tax 
authorities, information is not. Moreover, collection practices differ 
little for highly compliant taxpayers and those that are riskier. These 
features of tax administration impose serious constraints on the 
further development of tax policy. In the field of indirect taxes, they 
prevent more uniform (and less distortive) tax treatments of goods 
and services. In the field of direct taxes, they limit the size of the 
personal income tax base and preclude more progressive taxation 
both within the income tax itself and in the tax system overall.56   
54  Generally, the use of indirect tax invoices has seriously undermined 
income tax compliance on the part of businesses (whether or not incorporated): 
instead of auditing taxpayer accounts and determining whether claimed expenses 
correspond to real business outlays, tax collectors grant or deny deductions for 
income tax purposes based entirely on whether invoices in the right proportions are 
presented. For most businesses, therefore, compliance under the income tax 
involves not maintaining truthful and accurate accounting entries, but assembling 
invoices (whether for genuine transactions or purchased through the black-market). 
Where tax agencies cannot be assured of compliance through controlling the use of 
invoices, arbitrary limitations on deductible expenses are adopted to prevent 
revenue loss. 
55 As pessimistic as the above appraisal sounds, it is in fact not too different 
from the Chinese government’s own assessments. See State Administration of 
Taxation (SAT), Notice Regarding Conducting Research on Crucial Issues in 
Deepening Tax Administrative Reform (Guoshuibanhan [2012]127), May 17, 
2012; SAT, Plan for Further Deepening Tax Administration Reform (Discussion 
Draft, November 2012, on file with author). The latter document acknowledges 
many of the weaknesses in tax administration just described. 
56 For the regressivity of the Chinese tax system, see Azizur Khan and Carl 
Riskin, “Growth and Distribution of Household Income in China between 1995 
and 2002” (2007) in Inequality and Public Policy in China, eds. Gustafsson, Bjorn, 
 
Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance Wei Cui  
 Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance 15 
These features, of course, also characterize tax administration in 
most developing countries.57 Now, in many ways, these 
commonalities in tax administration between China and other 
developing countries should be surprising. China has one of the 
smallest shadow economies among all developing countries.58 Its 
agricultural sector represents only 10% of GDP, and its financial 
sector is relatively developed.59 The country also enjoys a relatively 
high literacy level. In addition to these well-known facts, it is also 
important to note that Chinese tax administration has experienced 
dramatic improvements in its human capital in the last decades. As 
recently as in 1997, the percentage of formal, permanent employees 
of Chinese tax agencies who had a post-secondary degree (junior 
college, college, or higher) was merely 40%. As of 2010, that 
percentage has climbed to 90%. Chart 1 illustrates this impressive 
trend for one of the two parts of Chinese tax administration, the state 
tax bureau (STB) system.60 Chart 2, depicting changes in the age 
composition of STB employees, suggests that Chinese tax 
administrators have tended to stay in their jobs, accumulating years 
of experience and retiring later.61 In general, tax bureaus are also 
regarded as attractive employers and are among the top choices for 
young people entering the competitive civil service exam each 
Li Shi, and Terry Sicular, 35–60 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
57 See e.g. Bird, supra note 1, at 248; IMF 2011 Report, supra note 7, at 10; 
Bird, supra note 35, at 45-46. 
58 See Friedrich Schneider, et al, “Shadow Economies All over the World: 
New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007” (2010) World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 5356, p 22 (finding that).  
59 For a recent, generally positive assessment of financial sector development 
in China, see World Bank/IMF, “China: Financial Sector Assessment” (2011) 
(available at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WB-
Chinas-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Report.pdf) 
60 The STB and LTB systems are primarily distinguished by the types of 
taxes they collect: STBs collect taxes the revenue of which went exclusively or in 
large part to the central government, whereas LTBs collected mostly taxes the 
revenue of which was primarily claimed by sub-national governments. As of 2010, 
the STB system is larger in terms of staff size by approximately 50,000 persons, 
and also collected more than twice the amount of tax revenue than the LTB 
system. 
61 Similar patterns hold for the other part of Chinese tax administration, the 
local tax bureau (LTB) system, although they are not displayed here. The figures in 
Charts 1 and 2, as well as similar analyses for LTB personnel trends, are based on 
an original dataset on the composition of Chinese tax agency personnel from 1993 
to 2010 compiled by the author. 
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year.62 All of these features of the Chinese economy and its tax 
administration workforce suggest that China should be further along 
the path of relying on self-assessment and audits than it is, and that 
the Chinese government should be gathering more information about 






Adding to the puzzle is that fact that the combination of 
voluntary compliance with risk-based administration was actually the 
central goal of previous tax administration reforms.63 Yet this goal 
has continuously eluded reformers. In the early and mid-1990s, the 
62 For a recent discussion of the importance of pecuniary incentives in tax 
administration, see Adnan Q. Khan, Asim I. Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken, 
“Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax 
Collectors” (2014) NBER Working Paper No. 20627. 
63  See, e.g. The Implementation Plan for Reforming the Industrial and 
Commercial Tax System (adopted by the SAT on Dec. 11, 1993, and approved by 
the State Council on Dec. 25, 1993); Notice of the State Council Forwarding the 
State Administration of Taxation’s Agenda for Deepening the Reform of Tax 
Administration (Guobanfa [1997]1, January 23, 1997) 
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State Administration of Taxation (SAT, the national ministerial 
agency supervising most tax collection in China64)  several times 
obtained political endorsement from the highest levels for its vision 
of developing a tax system that is built on self-assessment, audits, 
taxpayer service, and the rule of law.65 The Law on the 
Administration of Tax Collection, which remains to be one of the 
few national statutes governing tax matters in China today, was 
enacted in 1992 to empower tax administrators in a new market 
economy. It was then extensively amended in 2001 to give tax 
agencies greater capacity to gather taxpayer information and enforce 
tax law. A fundamental tax reform in 1994, as well as a well-known 
government-wide effort to improve administrative efficiency in 
2000,66 gave the tax bureaucracy opportunities to carry out major 
organizational and personnel changes.67 Thus whatever has held 
back the development of modern tax administration in China, it is not 
for the lack of “political will” in any obvious sense of the term. 
In summary, all of the usual suspects that purportedly obstruct 
sound tax administration in developing countries cannot explain 
China’s failure to implement a system based on self-assessment and 
risk-based management informed by taxpayer data. The aim of the 
64 Indirect taxes imposed on imports and exports of goods are collected by 
customs agencies. For more on the SAT, see note 86 infra and accompanying text. 
65 The Chinese government’s strategy for improving tax administration in the 
1990s would probably meet the approval of most specialists in tax administration. 
The 1997 reform of tax administration, the implementation of which was 
completed in the early 2000s, included four components: (i) establishing a system 
of voluntary tax declaration and centralized tax payment, which replaced a prior 
system under which tax was assessed to and collected from specific taxpayers by 
individual tax administrators; (ii) investing in taxpayer services, including the 
publication of law, regulations and administrative guidance, and the setting up of 
taxpayer service centers, so as to facilitate self-compliance; (iii) developing 
computerized systems in which taxpayer information can be stored and analyzed, 
enabling tax agencies to monitor taxpayer compliance; and (iv) developing audit 
functions directed both at regular tax filing and compliance by taxpayers, and at 
specific industries and taxpayer types (based on risk), in addition to investigating 
serious non-compliance. In implementing all of these strategies, the rule of law 
was to be a guiding principle. See Guobanfa [1997]1, supra note 63.  
66 See Erik Brødsgaard Kjeld, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System 
in China” (2002) 170 The China Quarterly 361-386. 
67 Throughout this process, the design of tax administration in China also 
received important support (both intellectual and financial) from the United 
Nations Development Program, the IMF, the World Bank and even the Japanese 
government. SAT, Outline of the Strategic Plan for China’s Tax Collection and 
Administration for 2002-2006, Guoshuihan [2003]267, March 10, 2003. 
 
Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance  
18   
next three Parts of this article is to identify a culprit missing from the 
purview of received wisdom.  
Before setting out in this investigation, two preliminary remarks 
are in order. First, because the Chinese government itself views 
taxpayer self-assessment and risk-based administration as the goal of 
administrative reforms, and because this is consistent with the 
mainstream views of international organizations such as the IMF and 
the OECD, I occasionally speak of “improving” or “modernizing” 
tax administration as though the superiority of self-assessment and 
risk-based administration is unquestioned.68 This is strictly speaking 
unnecessary, since the main arguments of the article are about the 
causes of non-rule-based tax collection, however the latter is 
evaluated. For these arguments to be of interest, it is enough that 
non-rule-based tax collection arises not by design (i.e. not because it 
is deliberately adopted).  
Second, what is the connection between modern tax 
administration—supposing that means self-assessment and risk-
based administration—and rule-based administrative practices? The 
connection seems fundamental: the rule of law seems to be a 
necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for self-assessment and 
risk-based administration. For self-assessment to be possible, 
taxpayers need to be able to determine their tax liabilities based on 
published rules. In turn, risk-based administration means focusing 
administrative resources on detecting and punishing those who do 
not follow the rules.69 It is difficult to conceive of a system of 
voluntary compliance where rules are either not known or not 
enforced. The suggestion here is not to blame unsuccessful tax 
administration on the weakness of the rule of law, as though the 
latter is an independently given trait of the social environment in 
which tax administrators operate.70 Instead, Parts II-IV will highlight 
tax administrative techniques and organizational configurations that 
directly affect people’s attitudes towards the law and their 
compliance behavior, and it is such basic attitudes and behavior that 
give content to the concept of rule of law relevant here.  
68 Part V discusses a dissenting view. 
69 For further elaboration, see paragraph accompanying note 137 infra. 
70  Nor are all components of the multi-faceted concept of rule of law 
relevant. For example, as will be argued in Part IV.B, whatever weaknesses are 
suffered by the Chinese judiciary are unlikely to have contributed to the current 
problems of tax administration. 
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II. DECENTRALIZATION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CHINESE TAX 
ADMINISTRATION  
 
The culprit I am about to identify for the difficulties in 
improving Chinese tax administration is excessive decentralization. 
The term “decentralization”, however, means very different things to 
different people, and when these meanings are not adequately 
specified, some might find it surprising to hear that 
“decentralization” can be a bad thing, and that “centralization” is 
what I will propose for curing administrative maladies. The goal of 
this Part is to clarify the specific meaning of administrative 
“decentralization” in China, both in concrete organizational details 
and in systematic, quantitative terms. I begin by showing how a 
county-level tax bureau in China is organized. As discussed below, 
the majority of Chinese tax administrators—some 400,000 of them—
work at these county-level tax agencies. Alongside another large set 
of tax administrators that staff below-county-level “outposts”, they 
constitute the frontline of the tax bureaucracy dealing with taxpayers 
on a daily basis. What county-level tax bureaus (and their subsidiary 
“outposts”) do—and don’t do—have a decisive influence on Chinese 
taxpayers’ compliance options.  
 
A. County-Level Tax Bureaus, Outposts, and the Meaning of Decentralization 
 
China has 2,856 county-level jurisdictions. County-level tax 
bureaus constitute, in Chinese bureaucratic parlance, the lowest level 
of “all-purpose” bureaus. That is, such bureaus play many roles, and 
the first among these roles is typically embodied physically in a tax 
service center, a building (often a big and bustling place) where 
businesses register for tax purposes, file monthly, quarterly or other 
periodic returns, make actual payments for taxes (and fines and 
penalties), apply for special tax treatments, and purchase or replenish 
their supplies of tax invoices. The central government pushed for 
establishing these tax service centers across China during the 1997 
reform of tax administration, in order to ensure that payments of tax 
are centralized (to prevent corruption and embezzlement), and to 
make possible taxpayer voluntary compliance.71 
71  See supra note 65. This aspect of the 1997 reform was arguably 
successful. 
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Yet the administrative heart of the county bureau is not the tax 
service center. It is instead an internal division for taxpayer 
management. This division fulfills an extremely broad set of 
functions,72 including: managing taxpayer registration, reviewing 
and verifying tax returns, carrying out routine inspections, making 
assessments, determining penalties, giving publicity to tax law, and 
providing taxpayer education, training, and other services. Moreover, 
taxpayer management divisions (at least in theory) are expected to 
conduct taxpayer research, gather information about the business 
activities and accounts of taxpayers in their jurisdictions, provide 
summaries of compliance by individual taxpayers and withholding 
agents, produce indicators concerning local economic performance 
and sectoral average tax burdens, and compare such indicators with 
information provided by superior units as well as other government 
agencies and sources of tax-related information.  
This broad range of duties encompasses both relatively menial 
and rather advanced administrative tasks. Included among the latter 
are what internationally would be thought of as “desk audits”, as well 
as the selection of taxpayers for more intensive audits, and the 
conduct of some field audits.73 However, given their quite 
comprehensive job description, taxpayer management divisions are 
remarkably internally undifferentiated. There is no general practice 
for setting up internal sub-divisions to deal with different types of 
taxes74 or of taxpayers. Instead, the allocation of work within 
taxpayer management divisions usually follows the “taxpayer 
manager system”. That is, each individual staff member is designated 
to be the manager for a portfolio of specific taxpayers, with each 
portfolio comprising up to hundreds of businesses. With respect to 
the multitude of taxpayers in her portfolio, each manager assembles 
72  SAT, Recommendations Regarding Further Standardizing the Internal 
Organization and Clearly Delineating the Duties and Divisions of Labor within the 
State Tax Bureau System (Guoshuifa [2004] 125, Sep. 3, 2004)   
73 China has designated a special kind of tax audit or inspection, shuiwu 
jicha, to be carried out by a separate system—the system of tax inspection 
bureaus—operating independently from all-purpose tax bureaus. Inspection 
bureaus at least historically have focused on tax frauds and outright tax evasion, 
and their audits/investigations are generally not ongoing with respect to most 
taxpayers. Therefore, whatever risk-based administrative practices may develop in 
China, they are likely to emerge primarily in the taxpayer management divisions. 
74 Although the bifurcation of tax administration into the state tax bureau and 
local tax bureau systems is based on tax types (see note 60 supra), each system 
administers quite a variety of different taxes.  
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information and makes general assessments of their level of 
compliance, as well as provide taxpayer services upon request.75  
The taxpayer manager system thus establishes, for each business 
taxpayer, access to a tax administrator. And each such administrator 
is responsible for supervising the compliance of a sizeable 
population of taxpayers, often with respect to multiple types of taxes. 
This unusual arrangement raises the question: Why is the taxpayer 
manager system adopted? Why is it that everyone in the taxpayer 
management division generally does the same thing, just covering 
different specific taxpayers? What, for example, prevents a taxpayer 
management division from establishing various sub-divisions, so as 
to enable greater specialization among staff members?  
These questions can be answered only by attending to the 
fundamental phenomenon of administrative decentralization. A 
county-level tax bureau is already at such a low rank within the 
Chinese state that an internal division of it, such as a taxpayer 
management unit, almost could not have a separate official rank.76 
Therefore, subdivisions of a taxpayer management division would 
not be hierarchical.77 It is also not possible, to circumvent this 
problem of not being able to create hierarchies below a division that 
are required by specialization, simply to have more divisions within 
a county-level tax bureau. Again because a county-level bureau sits 
at such a low level of the bureaucratic scale, there are general 
75 To prevent corruption, tax managers are rotated every two years among 
different portfolios of taxpayers. They also generally do not collect tax payments, 
nor issue penalties, nor negotiate tax reductions or settlements. Instead, they may 
conduct field inspections and issue reports on taxpayers on the basis of such 
inspections. 
76 A name for such a division, “gu”, had to be invented in administrative 
practice so as to give some recognition to the leader of the division. The rank of a 
“gu” is not formally recognized in the Civil Servant Law. Essentially, a “gu” is the 
lowest tier of bureaucratic organization at which a leader may be designated; no 
differentiation of rank in civil service, and only minute differences in pay scale, are 
possible below a “gu”. 
77 It might be argued that a non-hierarchical division of labor is conceivable, 
and therefore the infeasibility of hierarchy does not explain the lack of division of 
labor. That is, it is conceivable for a group of civil servants (say 30 people) all at 
the lowest bureaucratic ranks to divide up specialization within themselves, so that 
some are responsible for taxpayer registration, some for providing information for 
each type of taxes, some for audits, and others for revenue and taxpayer data 
analysis, and so on. (Such internally specialized cells would also have to be 
systematically replicated across the country). While conceivable, it is difficult to 
think of real-world embodiments of such organizational structures within 
bureaucracies anywhere.  
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limitations—imposed not on tax administration alone but on all 
government agencies—as to how many internal divisions it can have. 
As all-purpose bureaus are generally expected to have numerous 
other divisions,78 further division of labor within taxpayer 
management is bureaucratically not feasible.  
Now, Chinese counties can be quite large, in terms of both 
population and the size of their economies. Thus even though there 
are close to 3000 county-level jurisdictions in the country, for much 
of the Chinese population and many Chinese businesses, the county 
government is not “low down”, but “high up”. This reality is 
certainly reflected in tax administration: for many Chinese taxpayers, 
the real face of the tax system is not the county-level tax bureau, but 
a large network of branch tax bureaus and tax offices/stations, each 
covering three to five township-level jurisdictions.79 These are called 
“outposts”,80 and their broad functions essentially match those 
carried out by the taxpayer management divisions of county-level 
bureaus.81 Like taxpayer management divisions of county-level 
bureaus, outposts also follow the taxpayer manager system, with 
individual administrators comprehensively covering portfolios of 
taxpayers. Similarly, at most one person in each outpost has a title (at 
the lowest possible rank) of a “leader”, while the rest of the 
employees are, to put it bluntly, bureaucratic nobodies.82  
By contrast to both outposts and county-level bureaus, tax 
bureaus at higher levels—including prefectural/municipal 
78  These typically include a legal and policy division (staffed by a few 
individuals who provide legal advice to taxpayer managers and handle formal 
appeals when they arise); a planning and accounting division; a central clerical 
office; and one or two other divisions that that handle internal administrative 
matters, including personnel and anti-corruption supervision.   
79 There are 40,906 township-level jurisdictions in China as of 2010. 
80 Outposts are not “all-purpose”: while some outposts in remote areas also 
process actual tax payments, no outposts contain legal, planning, personnel, and 
clerical functions. 
81  These range from field inspections of taxpayer business activities and 
accounts, assembling and analyzing compliance data, comparing such data with 
data provided by superior agencies or other government agencies to detect tax 
evasion, and liaising with the legal and revenue planning divisions of county-level 
bureaus to address commonly observed issues in tax collection. 
82 Outposts and taxpayer management divisions within the same jurisdiction 
would normally not duplicate taxpayer portfolios. They are thus substitutes, and 
collectively carry out “taxpayer management”. One difference between the two, 
especially in the Local Tax Bureau system, is that outposts may be partially funded 
by lower-than-county-level government, and may need to attend to the revenue 
targets and needs of these lower-level governments. 
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jurisdictions and, above them, provincial-level jurisdictions83—
generally do not directly face taxpayers. Instead, they perform a large 
range of policy, political, and superior administrative functions, such 
as determining the internal organization of lower-level agencies, 
budgeting, and appointment. These bureaus are permitted to have a 
greater number of internal divisions due to these additional functions, 
and their internal divisions also enjoy higher bureaucratic ranks. 
They have even been permitted to have specialized divisions 
handling international tax matters, but a proposal in 2002 to set up 
large-taxpayer units at these higher-level bureaus was never 
implemented.84  
The foregoing outline of the allocation of administrative 
functions along the hierarchy of subnational tax administration 
allows us to define the phenomenon of “administrative 
decentralization”, which, the rest of the article will argue, 
substantially accounts for the difficulties China has encountered in 
modernizing tax administration in recent years. The meaning of 
decentralization can be broken into two components. First, there is a 
single bureaucratic hierarchy, and decentralization means that 
government functions viz-a-viz citizens are performed at the lower 
levels of the hierarchy. By contrast, higher levels of the bureaucracy 
do not exercise government power with respect to citizens directly, 
but instead issue commands to bureaucratic subordinates. Second, 
the lower the bureaucratic rank, the more geographically dispersed 
are units within that rank, and the smaller is their geographical 
jurisdictional reach. Decentralization thus implies that the scope of 
functions of a particular, citizen-facing government unit is usually 
delineated by reference to the finer geographic divisions of 
government. What is unusual about China is first, how deep (i.e. 
multilayered) the bureaucratic hierarchy is, and second, how 
resolutely the tasks of tax administration are placed at the bottom 
ranks of the hierarchy.85  
83 As of 2013, China has 31 provincial-level jurisdictions and 333 prefecture-
level (including large municipal) jurisdictions. In the following, the terms 
“prefecture” and “municipal” are used interchangeably to denote a level of 
government (where they exist) intermediate between the county and the provincial 
levels.  
84 Even the existing international tax divisions at these higher-level bureaus 
play mere advisory roles (similar to legal and policy departments), instead of 
taking over tax administration entirely from county- or lower-level agencies. 
85 As discussed in Part VI infra, decentralization is a general characteristic of 
the Chinese administrative state in the performance of most government functions. 
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Table 1 lays out certain quantitative information about the 
organization of Chinese sub-national tax administration in 2010. The 
italicized rows in the table correspond to tax administration units at 
the county level or below. It is apparent that most all-purpose tax 
bureaus lie at the county level, two levels down from provincial tax 
agencies. Moreover, by far the largest category of tax agencies 
consists in outposts.  
 
 
Table 1: Tax Bureaus at Different Levels of Government, 2010 
 
 STB System LTB System 
Provincial bureaus and bureaus for 
cities with quasi-provincial status 
46 45 
Prefecture bureaus 336 317 
Bureaus in districts of directly-
controlled municipalities, of cities 
with quasi-provincial status, and of 
prefectures  
1073 748 
County bureaus 2054 1949 
Branches, offices, and other outposts 10507 18178 
 
B. The Extent of Decentralization 
 
So far, I have said very little about tax administration at the 
national level. This is because the SAT, with a staff of only 850, 
constitutes a tiny portion (just over 0.1%) of total workforce of 
Chinese tax administration. As can be expected, the SAT undertakes 
very little direct administrative responsibility viz-a-viz taxpayers. 
According to a recent OECD study,86 which covered 35 OECD 
countries and 17 non-OECD countries/regions and which specifically 
examined “office networks for revenue bodies,” in 2011, China had 
the smallest percentage of tax administration staff working at 
headquarters (i.e. national) offices among the 52 countries surveyed. 
Further, if provincial tax bureaus are counted as a form of regional 
offices, China’s percentage of tax administrators working at either 
national or regional offices is still the lowest among all countries 
surveyed. Therefore, China is an extreme when compared to other 
countries in how “light” its tax administration is at the top.  
86 OECD, Tax Administration 2013: Comparative Information on OECD and 
Other Advanced and Emerging Economies (Paris: OECD Publishing 2013), p 83.  
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The OECD does not further break down tiers of administration 
among local/branch offices for China or any other country.87 
However, data compiled by the SAT (for the years from 1995 to 
2003) allow us to obtain a more fine-grained view of the “bottom-
heaviness” of Chinese administration. Chart 3 graphically presents 
this information by dividing subnational employees of tax agencies 
into three tiers: the provincial level, the prefectural level, and the 
county level.88 The chart reveals that despite the dramatic changes in 
staff composition (in terms of educations levels and age) in the tax 
bureaucracy during the 1990s and 2000s (as shown in Charts 1 and 
2), the vertical distribution of tax administrators hardly changed 
during the years in question, and remained very bottom-heavy. For 
example, in 2003, provincial-level employees accounted for only 5% 
of the staff in the STB system; prefectural level employees accounted 
for 16%, and those at the county level or below represented an 
overwhelming 79.5%. Because the most important internal 
reorganizations of tax agencies were completed before 2003, it is 
likely that the distribution of staff up and down the hierarchy is 




If one were to visualize Chinese tax administration in a 
pyramidal figure, divided into 5 tiers (corresponding to the national, 
provincial, prefectural, county, and township-level jurisdictions), 
then the proportions of areas of the tiers from the top to the bottom 
87 In many countries, for example those in Europe, such a further breakdown 
would not make sense: a local (as opposed to a regional or national) office is 
already at a municipal level that is much smaller in both geographical and 
population size than a Chinese county. 
88 The chart presents data for the STB system. Patterns for LTBs are similar. 
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would have the ratio of 0.1:4.9:15:40:40.89  The top tier, the national-
level SAT, would almost be invisible.  
Having established the character and extent of decentralization 
in Chinese tax administration, I now turn to the analysis of how 
decentralization may have contributed to the failures of tax 
administrative reform in China since 1997. It is fairly straightforward 
to demonstrate the incompatibility of decentralization with certain 
important administrative techniques: I have already alluded to the 
difficulty of setting up specialized subdivisions within low-level 
administrative units, and I will discuss similar difficulties created by 
decentralization for techniques such as large taxpayer management 
and the use of advance rulings.90 But the focus in the next Part is the 
more fundamental impact of decentralization on taxpayer compliance 
options, particularly on how non-rule-based collection practices may 
emerge. This analysis is more fundamental for two reasons. First, 
unlike traditional discussions of tax administration techniques, which 
assume the rule of law or at least the awareness of rules by tax 
collectors or taxpayers (whether they enforce or follow such rules or 
not), I precisely do not take rule-awareness for granted. Second and 
relatedly, tax administration is not a unilateral activity on the part of 
the government. The interactions between taxpayers and tax 
administrators determine both behavior and the perception of 
behavior, and such perception may have a major impact on how 
people interpret the needs of administration. For example, as 
discussed below, within non-rule-based collection practices, the line 
between compliance and non-compliance could be blurred, which 
would make it difficult to define what “risk-based” administration 
is.91 This is why I give greater emphasis to the basic incentives 
underlying compliance decisions.   
 
89  The figure takes into account the fact that as many as 40% of STB 
employees that would be categorized as working at the county level or below in 
Chart 3 in fact work below the county level. And in the LTB system, employment 
at outpost units represented a dominant 40% of total LTB employment. This means 
that well over half of the LTB staff engaged in routine tax administration is 
employed at a level below the county.  Putting the STB and LTB systems together, 
then, approximately half of the employees that are counted as county-level staff 
work in outposts below the county level. 
90  See Part III.A. infra on large taxpayer management; and text 
accompanying notes 123-6 infra on advanced rulings. 
91  Thus without changing the organizational pattern responsible for the 
emergence of such dynamics, there is no “technical” way of implementing risk-
based administration. 
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III. 
DECENTRALIZATION AND TRANSACTIONAL COSTS IN IMPLEMENTING 
THE LAW 
 
This Part argues that administrative decentralization has likely 
led to the persistence of non-rule-based tax collection practices in 
China. The arguments draw on a strand of scholarship in the 
economic analysis of law that identifies various transaction costs 
involved in the adoption and implementation of law.92 Louis 
Kaplow,93 for example, has described the costs of specifying the 
content of law to be applied in the future (promulgation costs), the 
costs for regulated subjects to inform themselves of the likely 
application of law to particular cases (labeled “advisory costs” 
below), and the costs for determining the correct application of law 
to a particular case in an enforcement action or legal dispute 
(enforcement costs).94 The analysis in this Part is inspired by this 
approach, but introduces certain important refinements to it, so as to 
shed light on the consequences of administrative decentralization. 
Specifically, the following analysis improves the classification of 
transactional costs by defining the concept of the communication 
costs of law, and advances existing discussions of the structure of 
advisory costs by introducing the possibility for regulated subjects to 
consult government officials about the content of law, as an 
alternative to learning about the law either by themselves or 
engaging legal advisors. Moreover, I will show that communication 
costs and advisory costs may affect compliance both independently 
and in interaction with each other.   
 A. Decentralization Increases Costs of Communicating Law  
 
I define the “communication costs” in the implementation of law 
as the costs of making relevant parties aware of the content of law as 
it may apply to a general class (or classes) of circumstances. For 
example, the communication costs associated with a newly adopted 
tax regulation include the cost of publicizing the regulation so that 
92  See Louis Kaplow, “General Characteristics of Rules” in Boudewijn 
Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, ed, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000), Volume V and the literature cited therein. 
93 Louis Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis” (1992) 
42 Duke Law Journal 557. 
94  Kaplow evaluates, in terms of these costs, the relative efficiency of 
adopting rules as opposed to standards in various circumstances. 
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knowledge of it may be acquired by taxpayers, tax advisors, and tax 
administrators. It also includes the costs these groups of individuals 
incur in actually acquiring such knowledge, through various kinds of 
training, so that they may be aware of the types of circumstances to 
which the regulation may apply. To a large extent, communication 
costs are incurred by or for the benefit of legal professionals, whether 
they are in the government, in law or other professional service 
firms, or non-legal businesses. These professionals have an interest 
in acquiring knowledge about what the law says independently of 
specific transactions: possessing such knowledge is what makes them 
professionals, and the cost of acquiring such knowledge is a type of 
fixed cost for being in the profession. By contrast, many regulated 
subjects have no incentive to acquire general knowledge about the 
law independently of the specific transactions they enter into. For 
instance, most taxpayers have no reason to learn about the tax law 
beyond the few rules that affect their ordinary activities.   
Communication costs as defined above differ from the cost of 
legislation (or “promulgation costs”) as modeled by Kaplow: they 
are incurred after either a legal rule or a standard is adopted. They 
can also be distinguished from the advisory costs incurred by various 
parties—government officials, advisors, and regulated subjects—in 
informing themselves of the law applicable to a particular proposed 
transaction. One can think of this latter type of cost as a form of 
marginal, as opposed to fixed, cost. For example, taxpayers may 
need to incur such marginal costs for a transaction under 
consideration by consulting a tax advisor. In contrast, for the tax 
advisor, besides the cost of learning about taxpayer’s circumstances, 
it may be that no marginal cost need to be incurred for knowing the 
applicable law—the advisor may already have acquired the 
knowledge, as a matter of fixed professional investment.95 Finally, it 
should be clear that communications costs is distinct from 
enforcement costs, which, like advisory costs, are triggered by 
particular transactions. 
To see the connection between decentralization and 
communication costs, start by noting the importance of specialization 
among individuals entrusted with applying law. Specialization 
facilitates learning. A specialized tax administrator, for example, will 
95 Of course, what each person knows always comprises to a greater or lesser 
extent what one has specifically dealt with in the past. But for professionals, we 
typically expect that their expertise is partially based on making ongoing fixed-cost 
investments in acquiring knowledge about the law. 
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more easily learn new rules in his area than someone who does not 
specialize. When tax agencies are internally specialized, the cost of 
communicating any new law to a particular agency (so that it will 
begin to enforce such law) should be lower than agencies that are not 
internally specialized. Effective training, for example, may be harder 
and more costly for the latter. If decentralization impedes 
specialization, then, ceteris paribus, it increases communication cost.  
One reason why decentralization impedes specialization is that it 
reduces the volume of a given class of transactions that falls within 
the jurisdiction of any agency. As a result, most agencies may not be 
justified to assign staff to specialize in the law that applies to such 
transactions. For example, for most localities in China, it is difficult 
to envision international tax specialists operating at a county-level 
tax bureau, let alone a sub-county-level outpost. There simply 
wouldn’t be sufficient amounts of international transactions arising 
in these jurisdictions. Accordingly, most local tax administrators 
would have very low incentives to learn about international taxation. 
The natural course to take in response to this would be to centralize 
international tax administration to higher-level agencies, with 
possible exceptions for local jurisdictions where cross-border 
transactions are frequent (e.g. counties where foreign direct 
investments are concentrated). As we saw in the last Part, the 
structure of Chinese tax agencies currently preclude this possibility.     
Examples analogous to international tax rules also include those 
rules that are particularly relevant to large businesses, corporate 
headquarters, and transactions among businesses across domestic 
jurisdictions. It is obvious that most local tax administrators would 
have insufficient incentives to specialize in these rules, since the 
relevant taxpayers and transactions tend to be geographically 
concentrated. However, if this were the only way in which 
decentralized administration increases communication costs, the 
significance of decentralization for compliance would be secondary. 
This is because international or large businesses are reasonably likely 
to adequately inform themselves of the content of law and to display 
a reasonable degree of basic compliance (even while pursuing a wide 
variety of legal, tax, and regulatory maneuvers and arbitrage). If 
taxpayers tend to be compliant in sectors that require administrative 
specialization, the lack of such specialization may generate problems 
for taxpayer service, but possibly not for the level of compliance 
itself.    
It is thus important to recognize other ways in which 
decentralization may increase the cost of communicating law to law 
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enforcers. One is the effect on career incentives. Decentralization of 
the Chinese variety implies a very steep administrative hierarchy. 
Most government employees starting at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
in the townships and counties, cannot expect to rise very high. Thus 
neither monetary compensation nor career prospects encourage low-
level government employees to invest a great deal in professional 
development.96 Another is the cost of transmitting information 
through a chain that has too many links. For example, until fairly 
recently, the SAT, like many other national agencies, issued informal 
guidance on law and policy—which comprises much of the 
substance of what is known as Chinese tax law97—that are 
transmitted layer-by-layer, from provincial to prefecture to county 
tax bureaus, and eventually to the branch bureaus and tax offices. 
According to government officials, not infrequently, a rule would fail 
to be enforced in some jurisdictions simply because some 
intermediate office did not pass it on to subsidiary agencies. A 2010 
SAT initiative aimed at promoting transparency in rulemaking, 
requiring that all guidance intended to be binding on taxpayers and 
other regulated subjects be published, has mitigated this problem.98 
But it is already remarkable that it took a government transparency 
project to solve this internal bureaucratic problem. Moreover, this 
pattern of layered transmission of information still characterizes 
other aspects of the communication of the law, for example the 
training of tax officials.99   
Overall, then, decentralizing government regulatory functions to 
the bottom of a steep administrative hierarchy increases the cost for 
government officials to learn the law. This effect applies to both 
higher- and lower-level officials: because the former are not directly 
engaged with regulatory activities, they may not have sufficient first-
hand experience or incentive to learn the law in detail (or reinforce 
what was once learned). Note that this is not a problem of principals 
96  Despite low turnover in tax agencies (see Chart 2 supra), Chinese 
commentaries on tax administration mention low incentives and lack of interest on 
the part of employees with some frequency. 
97 Wei Cui, “What Is the ‘Law’ in Chinese Tax Administration?” (2011) 
Asia Pacific Law Review 19(1), pp 75-94  
98 Id.  
99  For example, the SAT would sponsor training sessions targeted at 
provincial tax administrators; provinces would convene training for lower-level 
agencies, and such lower agencies for their subsidiary agencies. The reliability of 
the content of much low-level training therefore very much depends on the level of 
knowledge and incentives of the trainees of the higher-level training sessions. 
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properly monitoring agents, of making sure that lower-level officials 
implement the law. It is a problem of communication. In itself, the 
problem may be significant only in certain policy areas where 
regulatory complexity favors centralization (e.g. tax rules relating to 
large or international businesses). However, in interaction with other 
effects of decentralization, high communication costs can undermine 
compliance for a larger population of regulated subjects. 
 
B. Decentralization and the Structure of Advisory Costs 
 
Let us now examine how decentralization within a regulatory 
bureaucracy may affect the costs for regulated subjects to inform 
themselves of the content of law, and thereby their decisions 
regarding whether to seek such information. To do this, consider a 
simple framework for thinking about taxpayer choice.100 Suppose 
that a taxpayer, when contemplating entering into a particular 
transaction, is uncertain about the content of tax law applicable to the 
proposed transaction. He has three choices about how to determine 
the relevant content of law:  
 
(A)  He may engage in self-study (e.g. by consulting government 
publications), acquire professional tax advice, or inquire 
with taxpayer service units within the tax administration if 
taxpayer inquiries are routinely answered by such units;  
(B)  Alternatively, he may make a mere guess about the content 
of law, including the likelihood of detection of non-
compliance and applicable penalties; 
(C)  Finally, he may be able to consult with the tax 
collector/administrator whom he deals with during routine 
(e.g. weekly or monthly) tax compliance, regarding the tax 
collector’s view about how the transaction should be treated.    
 
In many countries, (A) and (B) are the only choices that a 
taxpayer has available. Only a small set of taxpayers, e.g. large 
corporations where audit teams from the tax agency are routinely 
stationed, have tax administration staff specifically assigned to them 
100 The framework set out here may be compared with related models in 
Kaplow, supra note 93, and in Yehonatan Givati, “Resolving Legal Uncertainty: 
The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax Rulings” (2009) 29 Virginia Tax Review 
137. See note 112 infra for a brief comparison with Kaplow’s model; and notes 
121-2 infra and accompanying text for some discussion of Givati’s model. 
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and deal with them on a routine basis. Taxpayers may have access to 
good taxpayer services, including having simple inquiries answered, 
but the government staff answering the inquiries are not the ones that 
will engage in audits and make tax assessments for the inquiring 
taxpayers. However, in a decentralized tax administration, where 
most tax officials are at the lowest level and their primary task is to 
monitor a specific set of taxpayers, (C) becomes an option for 
taxpayers.   
One may conjecture that choices (A), (B) and (C) are associated 
with different outcomes in terms of compliance with tax law. This is 
for two distinct reasons. First, different pre-dispositions for 
compliance may be associated with the three choices. A taxpayer 
who chooses option (A) is more likely to comply with the law than 
one that chooses option (B). This is more likely to be true when the 
content of law is more uncertain, and the amount of potential tax 
liability (and of penalties for non-compliance) is greater: it is hard to 
imagine a taxpayer who faces high risks of significant negative 
consequences without trying to find out more about such 
consequences, unless he believes that he can get away without 
suffering such negative consequences. The intrinsic compliance 
potential of a taxpayer who chooses (only)101 option (C) is more 
interesting. On the one hand, he is not someone who simply 
disregards the law, failing to inform himself of the content of law 
even when there is uncertainty. On the other hand, if he regards the 
views of specific low-level tax officials as the only information about 
law that is relevant, his compliance decisions may be more narrowly 
based on judgments about the capacity of these particular officials to 
detect and penalize non-compliance. This suggests that, all other 
things equal, the taxpayer is likely to be more non-compliant than a 
taxpayer who chooses option (A).   
The second reason why choices (A), (B) and (C) may produce 
different compliance outcomes has to do with the nature of the 
advice the taxpayer receives. Under option (B), the taxpayer receives 
no advice and merely makes an uninformed guess. Under option (A), 
the taxpayer receives advice, which we will assume is generally 
accurate. Both independently and in combination with the pre-
disposition to comply on the part of taxpayers who choose (A), this 
means that a taxpayer is much more likely to act in a compliant 
manner when choosing (A) rather than (B). The choice of (C) is 
101 Later on, we discuss the case where a taxpayer’s chooses to pursue both 
options (A) and (C). 
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again interesting. It was argued earlier that where decentralization 
significantly increases the communication costs of law, the 
likelihood that a tax collector does not know the law increases. 
Specifically, there is a distinct possibility that many tax collectors 
know less tax law than independent providers of tax advice.102 Thus 
a taxpayer may receive different advice under choices (A) and (C), 
not only because paid tax advisors (and taxpayers themselves) may 
be inclined to interpret the law differently from government official, 
but also because, interpretive tendencies aside, third-party advisors 
and enforcement officials may possess different levels of knowledge 
about the law.103 Because of this, a taxpayer who makes inquiries 
only with low-level tax officials (choosing option (C)) may ironically 
be less likely to be in compliance with tax law in the end than one 
who independently acquires knowledge about the law.     
In summary, it may be hypothesized that the even though the 
choice of (C) produces more compliance than the choice of (B), the 
choice of (A) produces more compliance than both the choices for 
(B) and for (C).   
How, though, does the taxpayer choose among options (A), (B) 
and (C)? We may suppose that all taxpayers aim to minimize the sum 
of the following costs: (i) the expected tax payments associated with 
a specific proposed transaction,104 (ii) the expected cost of penalties 
associated with under-payment of tax for the transaction, and (iii) the 
advisory costs incurred. Costs of type (i) and (ii) may be relevant 
under all three options. Costs of type (iii), however, will be incurred 
only under options (A) and (C). Thus if the expected costs of types 
(i) and (ii) are sufficiently low, no advice of any type may be sought 
(resulting in the choice of (B)).  
Turning to the choice between (A) and (C), the cost (“Co”) of 
consulting a local, low-level tax official “in charge” of the taxpayer 
under option (C) may either be higher or lower than the cost (“Ca"”) 
102  As discussed in Part IV.A infra, there is an endogenous relationship 
between the taxpayer’s choice among (A), (B) and (C) and the availability of 
advice under option (A).    
103 Even in well-functioning tax administrative systems, government officials 
may be more prone to errors at least relative to some tax advisors (if not in 
comparison to the average tax advisor). For example, tax agencies may be under-
staffed, and civil servants may be insufficiently paid, or insufficiently informed 
about the nature of market transactions compared to tax advisors. But the 
discrepancy may be small and tolerable. 
104 The taxpayer may learn, under either option (A) or (C), that the expected 
tax payment is so high that it would not make sense to pursue the transaction.  
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of consulting a knowledgeable third-party advisor under option (A). 
In many countries, for most taxpayers and transactions, consulting a 
tax administrator in advance about the tax treatment of a transaction 
may be difficult, whereas a market for tax advisors readily exists. In 
such situations, Co > Ca.105 In a decentralized system where tax 
administrators are assigned to supervise specific taxpayers, however, 
Co may be lower, sometimes significantly, than engaging a third-
party advisor.106 In such a case, the taxpayer would choose option 
(A) only if the advice it receives can lower the sum of costs of type 
(i) and (ii) sufficiently to cover the cost differential between Co and 
Ca.107   
Conversely, it also follows that a taxpayer is unlikely to choose 
option (A) and independently acquire knowledge about the tax law 
if, on average, choosing option (C) and inquiring with the “in 
charge” tax authority does not generally result in greater aggregate 
costs of types (i) and (ii).108 This condition may be satisfied because 
of numerous features of a decentralized tax administration that in 
themselves do not have to do with transactions costs. For example, 
when there are many decentralized tax collection agents, internal 
bureaucratic monitoring of their performance in terms of adherence 
to legal rules may be difficult. Instead, revenue collection targets 
may be adopted. If these targets are set either roughly at or below the 
level of revenue that would be collected if the law were faithfully 
applied, then, again, the decisions of tax collectors about how 
specific transactions are to be treated are likely to be advantageous, 
or at least not disadvantageous, to taxpayers who follow these 
decisions instead of law.109 Moreover, where tax administration is 
105 While advance rulings are well known in developed countries, the range 
of issues for which they are available tends to be limited. Advance rulings are also 
not systematically available in many other countries. 
106 For example, the only professional tax advisors available may be those 
serving high-compliance clients and who charge high fees. 
107 A knowledgeable tax advisor may recommend legal means for lowering 
taxes. The expected cost of penalties can also depend on whether one receives 
professional advice. 
108  In other words, it must be the case that one does not always get 
“unfavorable” answers by talking to tax administrators. If tax officials tend to 
arrive at the same conclusions about applicable tax law as independent tax 
advisors, then taxpayers should choose (C) over (A), if Co < Ca.  
109 If these targets are set too much above the level of revenue that the law 
dictates, on the other hand, appealing to the law may be of no use: the tax collector 
may still insist on extracting payments from taxpayers regardless of whether there 
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perceived to be weak, statutory tax rules may be written—with 
higher tax rates, broader tax bases, and more types of taxes on 
identical transactions—so as to reflect significant “expected slack” in 
enforcement. Again in such situations, it may not be advantageous 
for the taxpayer to follow the rules of law.110   
Whether  decentralized tax administration, the adoption of 
revenue targets as primary measures of tax agency performance, and 
the design of statutory rules specifically to take into account 
enforcement “slack” are mutually correlated is an important question 
deserving separate investigation. Each of the latter two may have 
adverse effects on the rule of law and the implementation of tax 
policy, but for the purpose of the analysis here, the crucial point is 
that relying on the views of a tax collector as opposed to an 
independent tax advisor may not be associated with greater expected 
aggregate tax payment and penalties. 
The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that, where (C) is an 
available option for taxpayers,111 there is a significant likelihood for 
taxpayers to pursue the option instead of option (A), in order to 
minimize advisory costs. The taxpayer and the tax collector may 
agree to a tax treatment—the former anticipating the treatment and 
latter endorsing such an anticipation—both in ignorance of (or a state 
of uncertainty about) the actual content of the law. Because of this, 
there is a greater likelihood that the subsequent conduct (e.g. tax 
payment after the implementation of the transaction) is not in accord 
with the actual requirement of law.112 Taxpayers may also use the 
is ground for doing so in the law. Or, if the taxpayer resists, the tax agency may 
seek other means to make up for the revenue shortfall. 
110  In such circumstances, some taxpayers may choose not to acquire 
knowledge about such rules, i.e. option (B) is superior to option (A). 
111 That is, Co is lowered to a level below Ca. Institutional arrangements (b)-
(d) also imply that option (C) may be superior to option (A) even if Co > Ca.  
112  Kaplow, supra note 93, analyzes the choice of an individual about 
whether to acquire information about the liability law applicable to a potentially 
harm-causing activity that the individual might pursue. The individual will decide 
to acquire information only if advisory cost is outweighed by savings in expected 
liability costs (net of the cost of care). The advisory cost may depend on whether 
the applicable law assumes the form of a rule or a standard. Because advisory costs 
are cheaper when a rule is available, some individuals might acquire information 
when a rule is available but not when only a standard is available. For these 
individuals, whether a rule or standard was adopted may lead to different behavior 
that is in greater or lesser conformity with the underlying norms of law, depending 
on the form of the law.    
Taxpayer choices within our framework can be analogized to the choices of 
Kaplow’s individuals, i.e. those who choose (B) are analogous to those in 
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combination of (A) and (C) to achieve a superior outcome than the 
choice of (A) alone permits. In this case, ignorance about the law is 
one-sided, but the result is again non-compliance with the law. 
This framework reveals several interesting features that may 
characterize non-rule-based tax collection. First, even when a 
taxpayer has acted differently from what the law requires (e.g. made 
an underpayment of tax), the taxpayer is in one sense not non-
compliant. It may instead be said to be “semi-compliant”, insofar as 
its actions are blessed by the tax administrator’s (non-binding) 
advice. Second, although taxpayers predisposed to non-compliance 
are more likely to choose option (C) over option (A), compliant 
taxpayers may also choose option (C) in balancing the expected costs 
and benefits of obtaining knowledge about the law. That is, semi-
compliant behavior blurs the distinction between more and less 
compliant taxpayers.  
Third, the resulting tax collection is non-rule-based in the sense 
that the tax liability is determined under incomplete information 
about the law. This is distinguishable from presumptive taxation, a 
practice that has received more attention in the existing literature.113  
Presumptive taxation is a matter of determining tax liability when 
there is incomplete information about the true tax base relating to a 
taxpayer’s businesses and transactions. It can be, and is generally 
recommended to be, rule-based: the factors that determine 
presumptive tax liabilities—even though they differ from normal 
rules for determining tax liabilities—are supposed to be set out in 
rules. By contrast, in the type of taxpayer-official interaction 
described here, even if the taxpayer is capable of keeping relevant 
records and willing to disclose relevant information, such records 
and information may not be assembled and transmitted to tax 
Kaplow’s model who do not acquire information about the law regardless of 
whether a rule or a standard is adopted; those who choose (A) to those in Kaplow’s 
model who acquire information regardless of the form of the law. However, in our 
framework, the choice that leads to less compliance ((C)) may be the cheaper one 
from an advisory cost perspective. More importantly, under Kaplow’s model, the 
existence of individuals who acquire information only when there is a rule but not 
when there is a standard is merely a logical possibility. Under our framework, by 
contrast, information can be introduced to predict how often taxpayers will choose 
to consult “in charge” tax officials instead of independently acquiring information 
about the law. Under a wide range of scenarios, such behavior may be quite likely. 
113 See Victor Thuronyi, “Presumptive Taxation,” Chapter 12 in Thuronyi, 
ed., Tax Law Design and Drafting 1 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996). 
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agencies—due to ignorance about the applicable law. As a result, 
information is simply forfeited.  
Fourth, although mutual understandings in deviation from the 
law may be reached regarding tax liabilities, there may be no 
corruption or any seriously unscrupulous dealing involved. From a 
tax administrator’s perspective, reasons for agreeing to enter into the 
type of interaction under option (C) might include (i) the desire to 
gather factual information and ensure revenue collection, (ii) 
possibly to enhance one’s turf/power and (iii) to create opportunities 
for rent-seeking. To be weighed against these are the fact that such 
informal interactions (iv) increase the tax administrator’s workload, 
and (v) reduce the deterrence effect of penalties. The corrupt motive 
((iii)) need not be dominant. Often, both the tax administrator and the 
taxpayer may be accused at most of benign negligence. 
In fact, because the type of non-rule-based tax collection 
depicted above is essentially continuous with rule-based tax 
collection and compliant behavior, and because the motives involved 
in the taxpayer-official interactions are benign, one can imagine such 
behavior and practices to happen on a massive scale. But where they 
are prevalent, the law ceases to be relevant beyond the boundaries of 
specific tax administrator’s knowledge about the law. Compliance 
ceases to be rule-governed, and tax policy—or at least the finer 
points of it—cease to be implemented.     
Because such phenomenon is conceptually continuous with 
compliant behavior and rule-based tax collection, its prevalence is 
hard to measure.114 Fortunately, the phenomenon implies a number 
of observable and distinct outcomes.115 The next Part discusses two 
of such outcomes, namely the under-development of a tax advisory 
profession and the low level of observed legal disputes between 
taxpayers and tax agencies. These two phenomena are of course 
important in themselves for the operation of tax administration. But 
if they can be further traced to administrative decentralization—
which, in the absence of the framework developed here, would not 
114 While the description of the phenomenon may strike those familiar with 
daily tax compliance in China as accurate, one might be wary of mere anecdotal 
evidence. Even such anecdotal evidence tells us something, however, assuming 
that the phenomenon depicted is unfamiliar to taxpayer and tax administrators in 
developed countries with mature tax systems.  
115 The framework developed in this part can be verified, for example, by 
sociological surveys of what taxpayers and tax administrators actually do. Such 
investigation, to the author’s knowledge, has not been attempted by anyone. 
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be obvious at all—the explanatory power of the framework would be 
quite significant.  
 
IV. 
INDIRECT EVIDENCE OF NON-RULE-BASED TAX COLLECTION  
 
In the early 1990s, when Chinese national policymakers drew 
the blueprints for a brand-new system of tax administration, their 
vision identified, with what seems to be remarkable learnedness, two 
interesting components of administrative reform. One was the 
promotion of taxpayer representation, with accountants, lawyers, and 
other “social intermediary organizations” assisting taxpayers in their 
voluntary compliance. The development of a tax profession was 
perceived to be the international norm and even said to be an 
indispensable link in tax administration.116 The thinking behind this 
view presumably was that given that China would be promulgating 
many new tax law and regulations, if a large workforce in a large 
economy was going to be induced to engage in voluntary tax 
compliance, and if government resources were going to be limited, 
the assistance of professionals would be needed. The other 
component was formal dispute resolution between taxpayers and tax 
agencies, through both an administrative appeal system and judicial 
processes.117 Both these two components, however, have failed to 
achieve the significance predicted of them.  
 
A. Under-Development of the Tax Profession 
 
As to taxpayer representation, 20 years later, the Chinese tax 
profession is widely regarded as under-developed. Law firms in 
China—whether domestic or international, and from the high to the 
low ends of the market—generally do not practice tax law, whether 
116 The Implementation Plan for Reforming the Industrial and Commercial 
Tax System, supra note 63, Section 6.2. The importance of tax service providers 
continued to be emphasized by the government throughout different phases of tax 
administration reform. See Guobanfa [1997] 1, supra note 63, Section 2(2)(ii); 
Plan for Further Deepening Tax Administration Reform, supra note 56, Section 
2(2)(iv).  
117 The Implementation Plan for Reforming the Industrial and Commercial 
Tax System, supra note 63 (reform expected to bring about a “new configuration 
in tax administration where lawmaking, tax collection, tax inspection, and 
administrative review and litigation form four equally important, coordinated but 
mutually constraining functions”).  
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in transactional or litigation practices (the latter is not surprising, 
given the low volume of tax litigation discussed below). While the 
accounting profession is more active in providing tax services, and 
while certification as a registered accountant requires examinations 
that include tax as one of the subjects, the market for tax compliance 
and advisory services provided by accountants is highly segmented. 
Major international accounting firms serve almost exclusively 
multinational clients, and the high fees they charge reinforce market 
segregation—few domestic clients are willing to pay. Domestic 
accounting firms have generally remained small and localized. The 
tax services offered by such firms appear to be limited: tax 
compliance is usually done in-house, and then usually within an 
accounting department rather than a separate tax department. Even in 
commercial centers like Beijing and Shanghai, tax sections in bar 
and accounting associations are inactive.118  
There is actually a third profession providing tax services in 
China. The profession of certified tax agents (CTAs) was specifically 
created and supported by the Chinese government and is supervised 
by the SAT. Given their government backing, and given the low 
market shares of lawyers and accountants in domestic tax services, 
one might expect CTAs to have prospered. In reality, although there 
are CTA firms all over China (many of which absorbed retirees from 
local tax agencies), they barely make money and struggle to justify 
their own existence. Throughout the past decade, CTAs continuously 
lobbied the SAT to mandate certain tax services and grant them 
monopolies in providing such services. To its credit, the government 
has so far declined to do so. The desperation of CTAs testifies to the 
low domestic demand for professional tax services. 
Yet this is precisely what the analysis of semi-compliant 
behavior and non-rule-based tax collection offered in Part III would 
predict. The wide availability of the option of consulting tax officials 
directly about the appropriate treatment of proposed transactions 
reduces the population of taxpayers choosing consultation with third-
party advisors, and thereby reduces the size of the market for tax 
advice. The only remaining tax advisors are those who serve clients 
118 The main manifestation of professional activity in the tax area is now 
online: as both commercial transactions and Chinese tax law and regulations 
become more complex, the internet has seen a growing number of active forums 
for the discussion of tax law. However, professionals tend to participate in such 
forums as individuals without advertising their businesses (if they had any). They 
also generally do not gather in person. 
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who choose the costlier ways of learn about the law (option (A)). 
Such advisors are likely to have invested in training in tax law to a 
much greater extent than most enforcement officials. This in turn 
increases the likelihood of different advice come from the two 
different types of sources of legal information.  
Indeed, decentralization producing inadequately informed 
enforcement officials may also be perceived by some taxpayers to 
decrease the utility of third-party tax advice: tax advisors can only 
tell them what the appropriate tax treatment should be; they cannot 
reliably predict what the tax treatment will actually end up being: 
that result is generally determined by the low-level officials in the 
“taxpayer management” system described in Part II.A. As a result, 
the practice of informal consultation with government officials 
reduces the demand for professional services even from potential 
clients who are able to pay for such services. In recent years, even 
the most powerful and lucrative international accounting firms have 
struggled with the question: What does it mean to provide Chinese 
tax advice? Is it to interpret the law, or is it instead to find out 
government officials’ interpretation of law? And if the answer is the 
latter, which government officials’ views are relevant? The 
uncomfortable truth is that when the law is not what provides 
guidance, individual outcomes are determined by the views of 
individual government employees populating the bottom of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. It is difficult even for very large professional 
firms to gather information about the views and attitudes of most 
individuals in this large population. 
The predicament of Chinese tax advisors can be illustrated by 
one administrative practice. To tax specialists in mature tax systems, 
option (C) discussed in Section III.B may bring to mind the practice 
of obtaining advance rulings, in which tax advisors in developed 
countries play important roles.119 But significant differences exist 
between taxpayers consulting low-level tax officials informally about 
proposed transactions and advance ruling “systems” as commonly 
conceived. As has been argued in connection with the application for 
private letter rulings (PLRs) in the U.S.,120 the key benefits of 
advance rulings include reducing legal uncertainty and the 
prevention of high penalties if taxpayer’s position turns out to be 
119 Rulings are favored by many tax advisors because they not only earn fees 
from preparing for a ruling application, but also reduce their own risk by 
substituting rulings for professional opinions issued to clients.  
120 Givati, supra note 100.  
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wrong. Certainty and mitigation of potential penalties are also 
possible incentives for taxpayers to initiate the type of interaction 
with tax administrators captured under option (C) in our analysis. 
However, any certainty obtained tends to have nothing to do with the 
law.121 If any certainty is created by such interactions, it is only 
because the same officials expressing their views now may be in 
charge of examining (if any examination happens) the transaction in 
question in the future. That is, the official’s view now may be a 
relevant predictor of his view in the future. Nonetheless, this type of 
“cheap ruling” has some reliance value: although the taxpayer has no 
legal ground for relying on the official’s pronouncement, the official 
may still feel bound to a large extent by his own pronouncements. 
Moreover, the likelihood of severe penalties is also reduced.122 
Obviously, it is difficult for professional advisors to insert 
themselves into this kind of taxpayer-government interaction and 
charge fees for services. Conversely, the type of ruling system for 
which advisors can charge fees for is difficult to set up in a 
decentralized system. Reflecting the fact of decentralization, China’s 
Law on the Administration of Tax Collection generally gives tax 
agencies at different levels concurrent jurisdiction over matters 
relating to particular taxpayers.123 This means that a private ruling 
issued by the SAT (or by a provincial or any other superior tax 
bureaus) may not be legally binding on a lower-level bureau. Even 
though the national or provincial tax agency is bureaucratically 
superior, if a lower-level agency disagrees with the legal 
121 The low-level tax administrators contacted are unlikely to be authorized 
to issue binding decisions in any way. Their bureaucratic superiors, colleagues 
who subsequently take over their positions, or even they themselves are all free 
legally to adopt different views about the relevant tax treatment in the future. 
Indeed they may be at greater liberty to change their views than independent tax 
advisors. 
122 It is worth noting that taxpayers in our framework do not face some of the 
considerations that, according to Givati (id.), discourage U.S. taxpayers from 
seeking PLRs. For example, Givati suggests that the application for a ruling may 
significantly increase the probability of inspection and of detection of a 
controversial issue. In contrast, if sufficiently many taxpayers make inquiries about 
the basic content of law without having independently informed themselves of the 
law, each inquiry may not significantly raise the probability of audit or detection 
for the transaction that the inquiry relates to. 
123  Law on the Administration of Tax Collection (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective Jan. 1, 1993) 
Article 14 (all references to “tax agencies” in the statute are to tax bureaus and 
branches at different levels).  
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interpretation adopted in the superior-agency ruling, it is legally 
entitled to disregard the ruling.124 The SAT has indirectly 
acknowledged this phenomenon: its guidance on the procedures for 
the issuance of private rulings stipulates that the request for a ruling 
should normally be submitted to the (local) tax agency in charge of 
the taxpayer, even if only a higher office has the power to resolve the 
legal issue raised.125 The ruling request would then be forwarded up 
the bureaucratic ranks for resolution. In cases where the applicant 
sidesteps the local tax agency, the ruling request must be brought 
back to the local tax agency for investigation, regarding which the 
local agency may suggest the appropriate treatment. The guidance 
thus rather explicitly discourages taxpayers from seeking shortcuts in 
the administrative hierarchy, in order to reduce potential internal 
discord with lower-level agencies. This, however, significantly raises 
the cost of the ruling process, and dilutes the value of the tax 
advisors’ access to government officials at the SAT level. 
 
B. Low Volume of Formal Dispute Resolution 
 
Scholars studying Chinese tax law or administrative law126 have 
puzzled over the low volume of litigation against tax agencies in 
recent years. All across China, only about 400 lawsuits per year are 
brought against tax agencies each year, and tax litigation currently 
comprises less than 0.3% of all administrative law suits brought 
against government agencies. Despite the fact that tax agencies 
employ more than 10% of China’s civil servant, and despite the 
presumed importance of taxation in the lives of citizens and the 
businesses they operate, tax had remained one of the less litigious 
areas of government. This suggests that whatever general 
institutional factors have suppressed citizens’ willingness to 
124  See, e.g. Shenzhen Energy Group Ltd. v Inspection Bureau of the 
Qinzhou Local Tax Bureau (Guixingzhongzi (2002) 30, Higher People's Court of 
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, date of decision in 2002 unclear) 
(describing local tax agency’s non-compliance with an SAT ruling)  
125 SAT, (Trial) Work Protocols for Replies Regarding Specific Tax Matters 
(Guoshuifa [2012] 14, February 10, 2012), Art. 8. 
126  He Haibo, “The Wearied State of Administrative Litigation” (2012) 
Journal of the Eastern University of Political Science and Law, 2012:2; Ji Li, 
“Dare You Sue the Tax Collectors? An Empirical Study of Tax-Related 
Administrative Lawsuits in China” (2014) 23 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 57.  
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challenge government actions in Chinese courts,127 factors special to 
tax administration may be at play.   
Existing studies have been rather quick in endorsing some 
obviously unreflective explanations of the low volume of tax 
litigation. The general lack of independence of the Chinese judiciary 
is often offered as the first culprit,128 and purported low win rates for 
plaintiffs are sometimes cited as evidence of this familiar 
proposition. This explanation, however, ignores arguments and 
evidence that Chinese courts have generally displayed growing 
independence, especially in areas that are not regarded as politically 
sensitive,129 as well as evidence that the “government gorilla” tends 
to “come out ahead”130 even in judicial systems that are generally 
regarded as independent. Another unreflective explanation of the low 
level of tax litigation is that taxpayers fear retaliation.131 From a 
comparative perspective, this explanation is certainly unusual: 
probably no one, including those in government, likes being sued, 
but why should we assume that Chinese tax agencies are aggravated 
by lawsuits to a worse degree, and are likely to be more vindictive, 
than other Chinese government agencies or than tax agencies in other 
countries?132  
127 Jinhua Cheng, “Institutional Options for the Settlement of Administrative 
Disputes in China: From the Perspective of Public Demand” (2010) Social 
Sciences in China 31(3) 5-26 
128 Li, supra note 127. For a general discussion of existing explanations of 
the low level of tax litigation in China, see Wei Cui, “Understanding Tax 
Litigation in China: A Systematic Content Analysis of Published Case Law” 
(2014) paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Law and 
Economics Association, Toronto, September 20, 2014. 
129 Yulin Fu and Randall Peerenboom, “A New Analytical Framework for 
Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China”, in Randall 
Peerenboom ed, Judicial Independence In China: Lessons For Global Rule Of Law 
Promotion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
130 Herbert Kritzer, “The Government Gorilla”, in H. Kritzer and S. Silbey 
ed, In Litigation: Do The “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 342-371. 
131 Li, supra note 127.  
132 Retaliatory actions, if themselves in deviation from the law, presumably 
may also be challenged in court. The fear-of-retaliation explanation of the low 
volume of tax litigation thus implies an unexplained sphere within which tax 
administrators have unchecked discretion, and in which they can easily impose 
unwanted costs on “disobedient” taxpayers. Since the rule of law is supposed 
precisely to limit or eliminate such spheres of government discretion, the fear-of-
retaliation explanation postulates an unexplained sphere in which the rule of law 
fails, in order to explain the much more limited phenomenon of most taxpayers 
choosing not to litigate. 
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If, however, most Chinese taxpayers and tax administrators are 
engaged in the type of semi-compliant behavior and non-rule-based 
collection practice depicted in Part III, then the low volume of tax 
litigation in China has a much more natural explanation. If, in the 
compliance game played most of the time, tax liabilities are 
determined jointly by taxpayers and tax administrators in a state of 
collective ignorance (and under-informedness) about the law, then a 
taxpayer deciding to hold tax authorities to the letters of the law is in 
an obvious sense reneging on the bargain. Thus it is not necessary 
that Chinese tax administrators are more vengeful than others against 
citizens who want to uphold their rights under the law; it is sufficient 
that the normal equilibrium in tax administration—one which 
taxpayers not only are complicit in but even derive advantage from—
is attained in significant deviation from the requirements of law. Part 
III explained why such an equilibrium might obtain, as a result of 
administrative decentralization.  
This alternative explanation of the low volume of tax litigation 
in China has two important implications. First, even if the Chinese 
judiciary were much more independent than it actually is today, 
taxpayers still might not bring lawsuits, if normal tax compliance 
continued not to be shaped by the rule of law. In other words, the 
rule of law has foundered at a much earlier and fundamental stage 
than adjudication, as a result of the level and structure of 
transactional costs in the communication and learning of law. 
Litigation patterns may be determined more by this more 
fundamental failure in the legal system than anything relating to 
adjudication mechanisms themselves. Second, since judicial 
monitoring of the actions of tax administrators is generally possible 
only if taxpayers are willing to challenge tax agencies in court, the 
non-rule-based tax collection practice engendered by administrative 
decentralization indirectly renders judicial monitoring unlikely. sThis 
casts serious doubt on the intuition of some policy advisors that 
judicial monitoring is what is needed to make tax administrators 
collect tax on the basis of law.133 
 
V. 
EVALUATING AND EXPLAINING NON-RULE-BASED TAX COLLECTION  
 
Part IV described indirect evidence for the type of non-rule-
based tax collection practice conceptualized in Part III.B. The 
133 See notes 9-10 supra. 
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discussion does not presuppose that active tax professions and active 
tax litigation are intrinsically good things. Instead, they are only 
proxies for how often legal rules are resorted to in tax administration 
and compliance.  
Knowledge of and compliance with rules is important for 
taxation for many reasons. In some areas of law, informal 
mechanisms can often serve as adequate substitutes for legal 
institutions. For example, community norms may regulate behavior 
with respect to property rights without the intervention of property 
law;134 and the desire to maintain one’s reputation may be sufficient 
to ensure performance of contractual obligations.135 In these areas, 
the choice of private parties not to learn about the law does not 
necessarily result in undesirable social outcomes. But in many areas 
of modern government activity, especially the implementation of 
modern tax and regulatory policies, social norms are very unlikely to 
be adequate substitutes for the law itself. Such policy tends to be 
made based on its expected impact on the behavior of large 
populations of private subjects (engaged in increasingly specialized 
activities), as well as on the distribution of resources among them.136 
It is essential for the implementation of such policies that private 
parties learn what the law is. Taxes and regulations thus depend on 
the rule of law in a much broader and more basic sense than the 
availability of independent judiciaries, constraints on government 
actors, etc.  
Moreover, many techniques of government administration (in 
tax as well as elsewhere) use concepts and categories that implicitly 
depend on the law. An example is risk-based tax administration. Are 
the semi-compliant taxpayers discussed in Part III.B high- or low-
risk? Insofar as tax agencies may possess little relevant information 
about such taxpayers (because the parties do not know what 
information the application of appropriate rules requires), and insofar 
the taxpayers themselves do not know the relevant law, they cannot 
be said to be low-risk. However, this means that the population of 
134 See, e.g. Robert Ellickson, “Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution 
among Neighbors in Shasta County” (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623; Eric Rasmusen 
and Richard McAdams, "Norms in Law and Economics", in A. Mitchell Polinsky 
& Steven Shavell ed. Handbook of Law and Economics (North Holland, 2007), 
Volume 2.  
135 Shavell, supra note 20, Section 10.2, Chapter 13. 
136 For example, while particular taxpayers (and tax administrators) may care 
about only the amount of tax paid, tax policy cares about whether taxes cause 
distortions, are sufficiently progressive, etc. 
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risky taxpayers will be relatively large, whereas the rationale for 
risk-based tax administration is to conserve tax agency resources and 
make administration more targeted. In fact, as discussed above, even 
taxpayers who are capable of investing in compliance (e.g. 
independently investigating the content of law) and therefore should 
have been low-risk may either be forced to follow the opinions of 
low-level tax administrators (in order to avoid friction) or 
strategically choose to consult their opinions. Thus, non-rule-based 
tax collection can make compliant taxpayers less compliant, and 
render risk-based administration infeasible.137  
It is important to consider now some alternative explanations of 
the phenomena described in Parts III and IV.138 A first alternative 
that may be proposed to the analysis in Part III is that the felt need 
for making inquiries with local tax officials arises from the fact that 
written Chinese tax law is full of holes and ambiguities. This fact 
itself implies a great deal of variation in practice among different 
regions. Naturally, taxpayers will need to find out what the relevant 
local practice is. In other words, if there are no rules to rely on, tax 
collection by definition will have to be non-rule-based.139  Could this 
explain such practices in China, without resorting to the fact of 
decentralization? 
The answer is that, while one might reasonably hold that there 
is a short supply of legal rules in China, the impact of 
decentralization is distinct. Suppose that tax administrators are not 
easily accessible, as they are under decentralized administration. 
Then the absence of clear legal rules may be expected to increase 
demand for tax advice—tax advisors would be asked to divine what 
the applicable legal rule might be. Gaps and ambiguities in the law 
may also be expected to increase the quantity of disputes, and some 
of that increased quantity should end up in courts. In other words, the 
dearth of rules alone should arguably produce a number of 
consequences that are in fact not observed. Conversely, as Part III 
showed, in the presence of decentralization, even if there are 
unambiguously applicable rules, informal practices that neglect such 
137  Another example of an essential regulatory device that depends on rule-
awareness is self-reporting. See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “Optimal Law 
Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior” (1994) 102 J Polit Econ 583, 601–
03. 
138 Some of these explanations are also likely accompanied by more positive 
evaluations of non-rule-based tax collection than has been so far implied. 
139 Put in terms of the analytical framework in Part III.B, option (A) may not 
be available. 
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rules may still (and do) emerge. Therefore, the state of Chinese tax 
law cannot by itself explain non-rule-based collection practices, 
although it might be shaped by such practices and by decentralization 
itself.140    
An alternative explanation may also be offered for the 
phenomena described in Part IV. It might be suggested that the core 
of the story told in Part III is that taxpayers have access to tax 
collectors in a cheap and informal manner. Once such access is 
possible, a variety of things can happen, and Part III depicted only 
one possible scenario: namely that, when neither the tax collector nor 
the taxpayer bothers to find out about the law (because the cost of 
doing so is relatively high), the tax liability they agree to will deviate 
randomly from the law (within certain bounds).141  But a different 
imaginable scenario is that both the tax collector and the taxpayer do 
know what the relevant legal standard is. However, the legally 
required tax liability serves only as a reference point for the two 
sides to bargain for a different outcome, which will always be lower 
than the legally required tax liability. That is, one can imagine tax 
collectors always being willing to offer “discounts” from the tax 
liability legally imposed (which is merely the “sticker price”), if the 
taxpayer makes a sufficient effort to bargain for it.142 If such 
bargaining is prevalent, then it will also follow as a consequence that 
140 For example, the authors of legislation and regulations may be too high 
up the administrative hierarchy, and too far away from the reality of tax 
administration, to provide timely legal guidance for issues in tax administration.  
141 The analysis in Part III.B argued that this option would be rational for the 
taxpayer to choose if the resulting tax burden is, on average, not higher than what 
would have been required by actual legal standards. It was necessary to make this 
condition explicit, if one assumes that tax collectors are interested in maximizing 
revenue collection, and that legal standards often serve as a meaningful constraint 
on the tax collector’s effort to maximize revenue. In other words, I assumed that 
neglecting legal standards could mean foregoing this form of constraint on tax 
collectors.   
142 It may be further suggested that this type of systematic discounting of 
stated (and well-known) legal obligations happens in more rule-based settings as 
well, as evidenced, for example, by many developed countries’ persistent tolerance 
for tax avoidance activities. Different explanations for such discounting may be 
offered. For example, some argue that legal loopholes (including tax shelter 
opportunities) exist because of the inherent nature of legal rules as the results of 
multi-criterial choices. See Leo Katz, “A Theory of Loopholes” (2010) The 
Journal of Legal Studies 39(1), 1-31. Others argue that tax authorities engage in 
some form of price discrimination. See Benjamin Alarie, “Price Discrimination in 
Income Taxation” (2012), manuscript available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1796284.  
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there is little tax litigation.143 The role for tax advisors will also be 
limited, except to the extent that advisors know what the going rate 
of discount is. In other words, the phenomena of low litigation 
volume and low demand for tax advice can be explained by a 
different type of informal collection practice than is emphasized in 
Part III.144   
The deliberate “discounting” of legally imposed obligations, 
through generally condoned informal (i.e. unregulated) bargaining 
between taxpayers and tax administrators (or between regulated 
subjects and regulators generally), is certainly distinct from the type 
of deviation from actual legal standards analyzed in Part III. The 
former implies obvious trade-offs of costs against benefits: for 
example, it might reduce outright tax evasion (by offering discounted 
tax payments), but it might also encourage collusion between 
taxpayers and tax collectors. Unless the benefits clearly outweigh the 
costs, such a policy is unlikely to be adopted.145  By contrast, in Part 
III, non-rule-based tax collection is portrayed as an inadvertent 
consequence of decentralization:146 it can be the outcome even if its 
social costs outweigh its social benefits. This logic arguably gives 
greater credibility to the account given in Part III than the possibility 
that tax collectors deliberately negotiate tax payments below what is 
known to be legally required levels.  
Similarly, as already suggested in Part III.B, it is possible to 
imagine informal dealings between taxpayers and tax collectors to be 
rife with corruption, which would also result in low demand for tax 
services and low tax litigation. However, unless one assumes that 
there is a high tolerance for corruption, it is not clear that corruption 
is the main way in which non-rule-based tax collection is engendered. 
The point of Part III is to show that it is not necessary to make such 
an assumption. Of course, ultimately, which of these possibilities—
deliberately ignoring legal standards as a result of either price 
discrimination or corruption, or inadvertent but systematic ignorance 
of applicable legal standards—more accurately characterize non-
143 An analogy would be that few people would dispute a speeding ticket if 
no speeding is punished unless it is significantly above the speed limit, and if 
moreover penalties are always negotiable.  
144 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.  
145 It is not clear that a case has been made that “price discrimination” in tax 
collection is an attractive policy option.   
146 It was crucial for the analysis there that decentralization implies not just 
cheap access to civil servants, but also, simultaneously, civil servants’ partial 
ignorance of the law. 
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rule-based collection practices in China or other developing countries, 
is something that can be ascertained only through closer empirical 
investigation in particular contexts.147 This article does not resolve 
this issue, but mainly identifies a plausible scenario that has not 
previously been articulated.  
It is also worth noting here that easy informal access to tax 
collectors is not something that should be taken for granted for 
developing countries. As a general empirical pattern, developed 
countries tend to have a much higher number of tax administrators 
relative to population than developing countries.  Even in China, the 
number of tax administrators relative to the size of the country’s 
general workforce is much lower than the OECD average.148 It is the 
fact that these relatively few tax administrators are geographically 
dispersed and heavily concentrated at the lowest bureaucratic rank 
that allows taxpayers frequent access to them.  
Finally, an overall question can be raised about the explanation 
of non-rule-based tax collection offered in this article. In Part I, I 
argued that Chinese tax collection currently relies too little on self-
assessment and risk-based administration, and that this forms a 
bottleneck on tax policy reforms. Yet Part I also began by noting that 
the Chinese tax system has been relatively successful at revenue 
mobilization, which is generally regarded as the more fundamental 
challenge for the fiscal systems of developing countries.  Could it be, 
then, that the analysis so far has given unwarranted emphasis to self-
assessment, risk-based administration, and other “modern” tax 
collection techniques adopted in developed countries? 149   Even if 
such techniques indeed have to be rule-based, there may be room for 
debate as to whether they are in fact optimal in the context of 
developing countries like China. For example, the discussion in Part 
II.A suggests that in Chinese county-level tax bureaus, a large 
portion of staff resources is devoted to ensuring that businesses 
remain registered for tax purposes (and pay some taxes), even if this 
results in each tax collector covering a large portfolio of taxpayers 
and not being able to specialize in audits. But the importance of 
keeping businesses registered (and remain in the formal economy) 
147 See, e.g. Khan, Khwaja, and Olken, supra note 62 (finding evidence of 
corruption in property tax assessment in Punjab, Pakistan, but that collusion 
between taxpayers and tax collectors is far from uniform). 
148 See Appendix in Leslie Robinson  and Joel Slemrod, “Understanding 
Multidimensional Tax Systems” (2012) Int Tax Public Finance (2012) 19:237–267 
149 I am grateful for two anonymous referees for both raising this important 
question. 
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has itself been stressed by IMF and other international 
organizations.150 If there has been a conscious trade-off in favor of 
focusing on registration (at the expense of audit capacity), then one 
may ask whether non-rule-based tax collection is truly an unintended 
consequence of Chinese administrative decentralization.  
This criticism indeed highlights certain unresolved paradoxes 
in the Chinese tax system, as well as possible weaknesses in the 
existing discourse on developing country tax administration in 
general. Why tax revenue has grown faster than GDP in China since 
1997 is a puzzle that has already attracted a small body of economic 
research, although no definitive resolution has been found.151 
Moreover, as discussed in Part I, China’s tax structure is not 
dissimilar to tax structures of other developing countries, which 
many have argued are inefficient.152 Yet the alleged inefficiencies 
have at least so far not hampered China’s economic growth.  One’s 
views about how such apparent paradoxes can be resolved will likely 
affect one’s evaluation of the effectiveness of Chinese tax 
administration. Many believe in self-assessment and risk-based 
administration as the appropriate goals of all tax administrative 
reform; it is also the orthodox view endorsed by international 
organizations.153 Yet the belief in the superiority of self-assessment 
and risk-based administration—and in rule-based tax collection 
practice generally—is generally based on experience. Like many 
other beliefs about tax administration, it has not been systematically 
empirically verified. Therefore, like the question of how to properly 
describe non-rule-based tax collection, the question of how to 
evaluate it also requires further empirical research. 
 
V. 
DECENTRALIZATION AS A SYSTEMATIC FEATURE OF THE CHINESE 
REGULATORY STATE 
 
The previous Parts argued that excessive bureaucratic 
decentralization has frustrated China in its attempts at modernizing 
150 See e.g. IMF 2011 Report, supra note 8, at 22; Bird, supra note 36, at 37-
8. 
151 See, e.g. Li-An Zhou, Chong Liu, and Xing Li, “Tax Effort, Tax Bureaus, 
and the Puzzle of Abnormal Tax Growth” (2011) (in Chinese) China Economic 
Quarterly 11(1), 1-18 
152 See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text. 
153 This belief is shared by many senior tax officials in China. See notes 62-
64, 66 supra. 
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tax administration in the last 15 years. Some readers may have 
wondered by this point: why is Chinese tax administration so 
decentralized? A full answer is beyond the scope of this article, but a 
preliminary answer is especially useful for understanding the 
character of explanation offered in this Article for the failure of tax 
administration (and the rule of law) in a developing country. Three 
points require emphasis. First, decentralization is a systematic 
phenomenon in the Chinese regulatory state. Second, it came about 
not as a result of routine policymaking in the stable development of 
the state apparatus but is likely attributable to specific historical 
processes and political forces beyond the control of ordinary 
bureaucrats. Thirdly, it nonetheless falls within a dimension of 
institutional design in which tax policymakers can at least carry out 
moderate reforms, and in which a wider group of political actors may 
decide to implement deeper reforms.  
The type of decentralization that characterizes Chinese tax 
administration is in fact shared by a majority portion of the Chinese 
regulatory state. In most regulatory areas—be it business registration, 
public health and food safety, environmental protection, policing, 
education, labor and social security, land management, and cultural 
and media regulation—the Chinese state is decentralized, i.e. 
bottom-heavy in a geographically dispersed hierarchy. The few less 
decentralized spheres of regulation, e.g. banking and securities 
regulation, customs, etc. constitute exceptions to a general rule.154     
This general pattern has also been implicitly acknowledged by 
recent social scientific scholarship of China. Some of the most 
influential theories of Chinese political economy in recent years have 
emphasized the role of decentralization in Chinese economic 
development.155 An important theme in this strand of the literature is 
that, at the start of the process in the late 1970s that eventually led to 
China’s abandonment of the planned economy, regional governments 
in China, unlike their counterparts in the Soviet Union, were 
characterized by an “M-type” instead of “U-type” economic 
structures: divisions of labor in production and regulation occurred 
within regions instead of across regions under the supervision of the 
154 See, generally, Li-An Zhou, Local Governments in Transition: Official 
Incentives and Governance (in Chinese) (Shanghai: Anzhi Press, 2008).  
155 See, e.g. the theories of “market preserving federalism” in Jin et al, supra 
note 22, and of “regionally decentralized authoritarianism” in Xu, supra note 22. 
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central planner.156 Consequently, Chinese regional governments 
were able to experiment individually with the transition away from 
the planned economy. Moreover, because each province faced 
similar problems of economic growth with some others, the 
performance of provincial political leaders can be compared. As a 
result, there effectively developed “yardstick competition” among 
provincial politicians in the promotion of economic growth during 
the terms of their office.157 Thus decentralization in regulatory 
activities simultaneously made it possible and created strong 
incentives for Chinese politicians to foster the development of 
markets. 
Underlying much of this theorizing is the assumption that at 
fairly low levels of the state, local politicians still command a wide 
range of regulatory tools. But this is basically the same as saying that 
in a wide range of regulatory areas, administrative decisions are 
made at very low-levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy—the 
phenomenon emphasized in this article. Nonetheless, this article has 
conceived administrative decentralization in a distinctive way 
relative to the social scientific literature. First, that literature is vague 
about the scope and meaning of decentralization. Some portray 
provincial decision-making as decentralized, while others emphasize 
that the logic of political competition reaches much further down.158 
From the perspective of this article, the phenomenon of 
decentralization can be appreciated only when one focuses on the 
county or even lower levels of government.159 Second, the political 
economy literature, not surprisingly, focuses on politicians who 
have, through whatever faction or line of patronage that they joined, 
become “generalists” who are evaluated by the results of governing a 
particular territorial jurisdiction. Very little has been said about the 
behavior and incentives of bureaucrats in local regulatory agencies—
within, so to speak, the more “Weberian” aspect of the Chinese state. 
Third and relatedly, theorists have tended to see a major distinction 
between whether a particular local government agency is “vertically” 
supervised by a superior agency within the same sphere of regulation 
156  Eric Maskin, Y. Qian, and C. Xu, “Incentives, Information, and 
Organizational Form” (2000) Review of Economic Studies, 67(2), 359-78. 
157  Hongbin Li and Li-an Zhou, “Political Turnover and Economic 
Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China” (2005) J . Public 
Economics  89 (9-10), 1743-62.. 
158 See, Zhou, supra note 153. 
159 See Part II supra. 
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or “horizontally” controlled by a local chief executive office.160 The 
focus of this article, however, has been on consequences of 
decentralization that emerges regardless of whether an agency (e.g. 
tax bureau) is controlled vertically (as in the case of a country-level 
State Tax Bureau) or horizontally (as in the case of a country-level 
Local Tax Bureau or lower-level LTB post). 
In any case, given that decentralization appears to be the 
preferred general structure of government in China, it can be viewed 
as exogenous to the design of Chinese tax administration: it is a 
structure that a single bureaucracy, even one that is as large as 
Chinese tax administration, may not be in a position easily to change.  
The degree of administrative decentralization in taxation lies 
beyond the scope of normal decision-making of Chinese tax 
policymakers also in another sense: decentralization is likely the 
result of specific historical processes. While it is certainly beyond the 
scope of this Article to investigate the historical origins of 
administrative decentralization in China, a brief narrative that throws 
the institutional analysis given here in historical relief may help 
underscore the significance and plausibility of the analysis.  
Before the 20th century, the administrative state in dynastic 
China was tiny: it had no more than a few thousand official posts, 
and delivered very limited government services.161 This may be 
viewed as the historical predecessor of the very lightly-staffed higher 
ranks of the contemporary Chinese bureaucratic state. What China 
did not have back then was the massive population of civil servants 
at the lower ranks of the state. Government functions in the lower 
tiers came into being during the 20th century, as the Nationalists and 
the Communists built government presences in rural China, to collect 
more taxes and, later under socialism, to carry out collectivization.162 
A notable feature of this form of government expansion at grass-root 
levels was that government agencies did not grow organically but 
was spurred by totalitarian mobilization: political mobilization may 
have allowed the government to extend its reach in ways that would 
160 Zhou, supra note 153, at 139-45. 
161  Ch'u Tung-Tsu, Local Government in China under The Ch'ing  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1962), 168-92; Bradley W. 
Reed, Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in The Qing Dynasty 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
162 See, generally, Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power and The State: Rural 
North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Philip 
Kuhn, The Origins of The Modern Chinese State (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). 
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not be efficient in periods of political stability and routine 
bureaucratic management. Tax administration, for example, was 
largely suspended during from the mid-1950s until the late 1970s, 
during the planned economy era. But when it had to be rebuilt in the 
1980s, it was built very quickly:163 hundreds of thousands of tax 
administrators were hired to be posted at local state-owned 
enterprises and markets to collect taxes where none had been 
collected before.164 The management and use of such a veritable 
army of dispersed low-rank tax collectors, however, pose very 
different problems for the long term.  
In other words, it is plausible to see decentralization in the 
Chinese administrative state as the product of two fundamental 
elements of the country’s past: (i) a (very) long history of a small, 
centralized government apparatus that was incapable of performing 
the functions of a modern state; and (ii) a shorter history (i.e. since 
the 20th century) of a quickly expanding network of government 
offices low in the administrative hierarchy, designed to carry out the 
commands of totalitarian regimes and not to cater to the needs of a 
stable market economy. In its current pattern of decentralization, the 
Chinese administrative state still operates in the shadow of this past. 
Clearly, these historical processes are beyond the control (and 
perhaps even the reflection) of reformers within tax administration.  
Explaining the failings of tax administration in terms of 
decentralization in the Chinese regulatory state is appealing because 
the latter is both a more fundamental phenomenon than the items 
being explained, and, at the same time, amenable to change. It is 
clearly conceivable for the government to decide to centralize tax 
administration to a greater extent, whether (depending on the 
particular administrative function concerned) to municipal, 
provincial, or national levels.165 To pursue administrative 
centralization in the sense of staffing municipal and provincial tax 
bureaus sufficiently so that they can directly deal with taxpayers, 
163  The size of the tax administration workforce nearly quadrupled from 
170,000 in 1978 to 600,000 in 1993. 
164 State revenue plunged despite this effort, as state-owned enterprises failed 
en masse after market liberalization. See Christine P. W. Wong, "Central-Local 
Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: the Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in 
Post-Mao China” (1991) 128 The China Quarterly 691-715.  
165 Centralizing large taxpayer management, international taxation, and the 
building of central information systems has been under discussion in China 
recently. See Plan for Further Deepening Tax Administration Reform, supra note 
56.  
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however, will be bureaucratically and politically difficult, if it is 
done in isolation from broader bureaucratic reform. It would re quire 
the deployment of political resources that bureaucrats in the SAT 
either do not possess or are unwilling to expend. However, locating 
the source of difficulty for reforming tax administration in the 
broader configurations of the state should, in the long term, better 




This article sought to demonstrate that contemporary Chinese 
tax administration displays many of the same flaws that characterize 
tax administration in other developing countries, particularly the low 
use of self-assessment and audits. I also showed that Chinese tax 
administration is extremely decentralized, in a manner that is 
determined by larger patterns in the organization of the Chinese state 
and arguably unique moments in Chinese history.  I then postulate a 
causal connection between the two phenomena—between the 
challenges faced by administrative reform and decentralization. The 
causal hypothesis is motivated by the fact that many of the other 
factors that are normally appealed to for explaining the limitation of 
tax administration capacity in developing countries do not seem 
present in the Chinese context. According to my hypothesis, the 
causal mechanism from decentralization to the unattainability of self-
assessment and audits runs through people’s ability and willingness 
to acquire knowledge of the law. When decentralization negatively 
affects people’s ability and incentives to inform themselves of the 
content of legal rules, non-rule-based practices emerge, making self-
assessment and many other tax administrative techniques irrelevant. 
The rule of law is an essential component of the causal story to 
which this article seeks to give plausibility. However, the way rule of 
law makes an appearance here is very different from how it has 
generally appeared in the tax and development literature. In the 
existing literature, the rule of law, while normally agreed to be a pre-
requisite for modern tax administration, is viewed as an exogenously 
given variable. Economists have been more willing to find some rule 
166 For a recent example of advocacy for the direct delivery of government 
services by higher level government entities, see Jiwei Lou, “Reconfiguring 
Central-Local Relations,” Caijing Magazine, April 1, 2012 (in Chinese)(editorial 
piece by China’s current Minister of Finance).  
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of law “indicator” as an independent variable in regression analyses 
than to inquire into how the rule of law may emerge within tax 
administration.167 In this article, by contrast, whether the rule of law 
will prevail depends crucially in the mundane but fundamental 
decisions of taxpayers and tax administrators to find out what legal 
rules there are. I argue that it is these decisions that determine the 
larger aggregate outcomes observed at the institutional level, for 
example whether there is a market for a certain type of legal advice, 
and whether lawsuits will be brought to courts.168 The “rule of law” 
variable in the analysis here is clearly endogenous.  
The causal story advanced in this article is capable of empirical 
verification (and refutation). How much does decentralization affect 
the level of knowledge and specialization of tax administrators? How 
much do interactions between taxpayers and tax administrators 
increase as a result of decentralization? How high is the level of 
(perceived) corruption during such interactions? How much do 
taxpayers substitute between third-party advice and conversations 
with tax collectors? Are outcomes significantly different depending 
on which is chosen? What is the respective significance of knowing 
and unknowing deviations from the law? These are some of the 
question that may be relevant to implementing an empirical test of 
the causal hypothesis in this article. The analysis given in this article 
is intended to show that these questions are worth asking, and that 
answering them may allow us to better understand the role of law in 
developing countries’ tax administration.   
 
167 See Robinson and Slemrod, supra note 146, at 252-3; Besley and Persson, 
supra note 5.   
168 For a recent theoretical discussion of the need (particularly for explaining 
the emergence of the rule of law) to distinguish between legal order and legal 
institutions, see Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast, “Microfoundations of 
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